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Repossession of Consumer Goods:
Due Process for the Consumer:
What's Due for the Creditor
Spencer Neth
One of the most effective remedies that secured creditors have had
against defaulting consumer debtors has been to replevy the goods securing the debt. The Supreme Court in a recent decision, however, held that
goods could not be replevied in a consumer transaction unless the debtor
was given notice and an opportunity for a hearing. After discussing
typical replevin procedures and the recent Supreme Court cases that have
affected those procedures, the author goes on to suggest a procedure that
would satisfy both the requirements of due process and the fears of
creditors that suc- a hearing might be prohibitively expensive. He also
examines the requirements of due process when the creditorrecovers the
goods through self-help rather than by replevin. The author concludes
that even if a hearing is not constitutionally required in self-help repossession, legislative judgment should provide for one, given the necessity
for a hearing in replevin.

I.

INTRODUCTION

tITONSUMER CREDIT HAS REACHED enormous proportions,
ironically at a time when personal income and wealth are
greater than ever before in the history of mankind.' Consumer
credit now outstanding in the United States exceeds $112 billion,
or more than $500 for every
THE AUTHOR: SPENCER NETH (A.B.,
Miami University; J.D., LL.M. Harvard)
is an Associate Professor of Law at Case
Western Reserve University, and is admitted to the Massachusetts and Ohio
Bars. His teaching specialities are Commercial Law and Consumer Law.

man, woman, and child.' This
scale of indebtedness is a relatively recent development. Prior
to the turn of the century consumer credit was negligible,
with most of the increase taking
place since World War IiV

A number of factors account
for this dramatic economic and social phenomenon: the develop1 "Consumer credit" as used here does not include first mortgage loans commonly
used to finance residential real estate, or transactions that for limited purposes are considered credit transactions, e.g., goods paid for by check or goods delivered prior to
billing. Most of the problems discussed here arise out of installment credit transactions.
258 FED. RES. BULL. A56 (1972). -The figure is as of May 1972. At the end
of World War I outstanding consumer credit was less than one billion dollars.
a Compare the figures below showing total consumer installment credit at varying
intervals:
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ment of durable and expensive consumer goods, an increase in personal incomes which makes repayment possible, a change in social
morals and mores, a growing appreciation among businessmen and
economists of the profit potential in consumer credit, and perhaps
in some measure the changing legal framework in which credit is
extended and collected.
From the creditor's point of view, the law relating to creditor's
rights and remedies has improved since the turn of the century,
particularly with respect to personal property security devices.4 Recently, however, there have been a number of changes and proposals
for change which would significantly affect the creditor's remedies.
Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the individual impact of the various changes in the law, we should expect
that any significant general erosion of creditor remedies would have
the following effects: to restrict the availability of credit, primarily to those considered marginal risks; to increase the cost of
credit, although not to the same extent for all classes of debtors;
to reduce the profits of those involved in extending or profiting
from consumer credit; or most likely some combination of these
three.' Although the point is debatable,6 I shall assume that any
of these effects would be undesirable.
One of these beseiged creditors' remedies - the repossession of
consumer goods by secured creditors - is the subject of this article. This past summer the United States Supreme Court, resolv1929
$ 3.2 billion
1939
4.5 billion
1950
14.7 billion
1959
39.2 billion
1962
48.2 billion
McCracken, Mao & Fricke, Consumer Installment Credit & Public Policy, 17 MICH.
Bus. STUDis, 1, 7 (1965).
4 The Uniform Conditional Sales Act and other conditional sales acts were generally
a significant improvement over pre-existing common law conditional sales doctrine
and were more suitable for consumer goods than the chattel mortgage had been. See
Bogert, The Proposed Uniform ConditionalSales Act, 3 CoRNELL L.Q. 1, 1-2 (1917).
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in most states during the early
1960's, clarified and streamlined much of the law of personal property security interests.
In addition, the small loan laws and other exceptions made to the general usury law
contributed greatly to the expanded availability of consumer credit in the last seventy
years. See generally Benfield, Money, Mortgages, and Migraine - The Usury Headache, 19 CAsE W. REs. L REV. 819 (1968).
5 Kripke, Consumer Credit Legislation: A Creditor-OrientedViewpoint, 68 COLurm.
L. REV. 445, 478-486 (1968).
6 For a discussion of the policy considerations, see generally McCracken, Mao &
Fricke, supra note 3. See also Randone v. App. Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 556, 488 P.2d
13, 26, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 722 (1971).
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ing divergent decisions in the lower courts, 7 in Fuentes v. Shevin,8
held unconstitutional the commonplace replevin method of repossession. Fuentes came only three years after the Court's decision
in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.9 which held that prejudgment
garnishment of wages, when made effective without notice and prior
to an opportunity for a hearing, violated the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Predictably, Sniadach was seized summarily by debtors' attorneys, especially Legal Services attorneys from the Office of Economic Opportunity,10 as a weapon to attack a wide range of the standard creditor
remedies including the summary repossession of consumer goods by
means of the ancient writ of replevin and by self-help repossession."
Fuentes has left open a number of questions and the legal implications and practical consequences of the decision are worthy
of extensive discussion. For instance, to what extent are the creditors' remedies currently found in the statute books and in the standard form contracts constitutional? If the remedies traditionally
available to secured creditors are in whole or in part unconstitutional,
what are creditors and their attorneys to do, besides throw up their
hands in despair? And how should the American Law Institute,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law,
7

Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Blair
v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971); Hall v. Stone, 229
Ga. 96, 189 S.E.2d 402 (1972); and Cedar Rapids Engineering Co. v. Haenelt, 68
Misc. 2d 206, 326 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup. Ct. 1971) held the procedure unconstitutional
prior to Fuentes as did several unreported decisions, e.g., Paldon Repossession Bureau

v. Oberg, No. 37281 (Wash. Dist. Justice Ct. 1972). Contra, Brunswick Corp. v.
J. & P., Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp.
645 (D. Md. 1971); Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1971); Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970); and Almor Furniture and Appliances, Inc.
v. MacMillan, 116 N.J. Super. 65, 280 A.2d 862 (1971). See also Lawson v. Mantell,
62 Misc. 2d 307, 306 N.Y.S.2d 317 (Sup. Ct. 1969) denying debtor's -motionfor preliminary injunction, permanent injunction granted sub nom., Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970). Most of these cases are discussed
in Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1233 (1972) written largely prior to Fuentes.
8407 U.S. 67 (1972), rev'g Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (ED. Pa. 1971)
and Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
9 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
'0 In a high percentage of the cases which apply Sniadach, Legal Services attorneys
represented the consumer. The impact of the OEO Legal Services Program upon the
development of the law is especially impressive in the area of consumer protection.
"1Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Col. 1972); McCormick v.
First Natl Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971) and Greene v. First Nat'l Exch.
Bank of Va., CCH SEc. TRANS. GUmE 5 51,930 (W.D. Va. 1972) (post Fuentes)
held self-help repossession constitutional. Contra, Adams v. Egey, 334 F. Supp. 614
(N.D. Cal. 1972).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24: 7

Ralph Nader, law reformers, and do-gooders generally respond to
this challenge?
While lawyers and judges have been attempting to fit old remedies into new constitutional bottles, the reformers and the consumer
advocates have been busy drafting new model statutes and revising old ones in a manner that would significantly alter the traditional
rights of the secured creditor. A number of states have recently
adopted reform consumer credit legislation which modifies the remedies of secured creditors, and virtually all of the remaining states
either have considered or are currently considering such reform legislation.
After reviewing the variety of state laws affecting the secured
creditor's remedies in consumer transactions, this article will attempt to describe the impact of recent Supreme Court decisions on
these remedies, and then propose legislative solutions to many of
the possible constitutional problems that have been raised.
II.

THE REMEDIES AND PROCEDURES HERETOFORE
AVAILABLE TO SECURED CREDITORS

A.

The Uniform Commercial Code

Part 5 of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),
law in every state but Louisiana, sets out the remedies of a secured
creditor and the procedures for exercising those remedies. The
UCC's remedies and procedures are supplanted, in whole or in part,
with respect to security interests in consumer goods in a number of
states by various statutes such as retail installment sales acts or, in
six states, by the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 2
The UCC provides that in the event of default the secured party
may take possession of the collateral without the aid of judicial process "if this can be done without breach of the peace.'"" Independent of the Commercial Code, nearly all security agreements, consumer and otherwise, contain language which seems to give the
creditor the right to repossess through self-help in the event of default. Frequently the security agreement will go beyond the Code
to provide that the creditor is entitled to enter the debtor's premises at any time to remove the collateral.
Alternatively, the creditor can "proceed by action." That is, the
' 2 The Uniform Consumer Credit Code [hereinafter cited as UCCCJ has been
adopted by Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming.
13 UCG § 9-503.
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creditor may use any appropriate local judicial procedure for the
recovery of personal property - usually a replevin action or its
equivalent.14 Replevin, historically 5 and under the practice current
in most states, typically begins with seizure of the goods by a sheriff
or comparable official upon the filing of a complaint, the filing of
a bond, and sometimes a sworn affidavit establishing the creditor's
right to repossess. The debtor usually can recover the goods pending a hearing on the merits by posting a counterbond, though this
is seldom done.'
The sheriff, having taken possession of the
goods, will turn them over to the secured creditor, although the
statute often requires him to hold them for a short period to give
the debtor opportunity to file the counterbond.
Once the creditor has obtained possession of the secured goods
he generally has the alternative of keeping the goods in satisfaction of the debt or of selling or otherwise disposing of the goods in
any commercially reasonable manner and applying the proceeds toward his reasonable expenses and payment of the debt.' 8 Any surplus proceeds from the sale must be remitted to the debtor, although
a surplus is rare indeed in the case of consumer transactions. If
the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the reasonable expenses of the creditor plus the debt, the creditor is entitled to collect
any deficiency from the debtor and any sureties.'?
14The action of claim and delivery is the equivalent of replevin in a number of
states, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §§ 509-21 (West 1954). See R. SHINN, A TREATISE
ON THE AMERiCAN LAW OF REPLEVIN AND KINDRED ACTIONS FOR GETTING POSSESSION OF CHATTELS 354 (1809) (hereinafter cited as SHINN). New York merely

calls it an action to try the right to possession of a chattel, N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAw §§
7101 to 7111 (1963).
15 There are a number of old treatises describing the history of replevin. J. COBBEY,
A PRACTIcAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REPLEVIN AS ADMINISTERED BY THE
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1900) is most often cited, but SHINN and P.
MoRRIs, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REPLEVIN (1894) are also good
sources for historical background material. Replevin practice is also described in 3
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 146-51 (1st ed. Reprint
1966).
'6The appellants in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), asserted that out of
442 cases of prejudgment replevin in the Dade County, Florida, small claims court in
1969, there was not one case in which the defendant posted a counterbond. Few
defendants are aware of their rights, and the ordinary consumer would have practical
difficulties in obtaining a bond. Id. at 84-85.
37 In practice, however, the creditor often takes immediate possession from the
sheriff, as was the case with Mrs. Fuentes' stove. Abbott & Peters,.Fuentes v. Shevin:
A Narrative of FederalTest Litigation in the Legal Services Program, 57 IOWA L REV.
955, 985 (1972) (written prior to the Fuentes decision). Abbott & Peters describe
the variety of state replevin procedures. Id. at 964, n.33. See generally Comment,
Laprease and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 CoLUM. L. REV. 886 (1971).
ISUCC §§ 9-504, -505.
'9 Id.

§ 9-504(2).
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If the creditor wishes to keep the goods in satisfaction of the
debt, a procedure analogous to strict foreclosure which was at one
time common in real property mortgages, he must give the debtor
notice to that effect and the debtor has 30 days upon receipt of the
notice to object. If the debtor objects or if he has paid 60 percent of
the cash price of the goods, or of the loan in a consumer loan transaction, the creditor must sell or otherwise dispose of the goods.2
The sale or other disposition may be public or private. The creditor
himself can purchase at a public sale and, in some instances (unlikely in consumer goods transactions), at a private sale. 2 ' The only
significant limitations on sale or disposition are that the creditor
must give the debtor notice of the time and place of any public sale
or of the time after which he plans to make a private sale and that
the creditor must in all respects act in a commercially reasonable
manner. The notice to the debtor enables him to exercise his right
of redemption by tendering fulfillment of all obligations secured
by the collateral, plus the creditor's reasonable expenses, prior to the
creditor's disposition.
Although Article 9 of the UCC has recently gone through a
rather extensive revision, the procedures and rights regarding repossession, resale, and deficiency judgments were virtually unchanged.2
Furthermore, few of the states adopting the Code during the 1960's
made any significant alteration to Part 5 of Article 9, and no state
changed the repossession procedures. 3
The consequence of the creditor's failure to comply with the repossession and resale procedures of the UCC are not clearly spelled
out and pose a problem area for creditors. Section 9-507 states that
the debtor is entitled to recovery from the creditor "any loss caused
by failure to comply" with the provisions of Part 5 of Article 9.
Under section 9-507 a consumer goods debtor is entitled at a mini20 Id. § 9-505.

21Id. § 9-504(3).
22

The revision of Article 9 did not alter the rights of the consumer for much the
same reason consumer protection was excluded from the original version of Article 9.
See notes 35, 36 infra & accompanying text. The Commission also payed deference to
the other bodies working on consumer protection legislation. Braucher, et al., A Look
at the Work of the Article 9 Review Committee, 26 Bus. LAw. 307, 319-20 (1970).
23 Mississippi changed UCC § 9-506 so as to permit redemption as if there were no
acceleration clause. MIss. CODE ANN. § 41 A: 9-506 (Spec. UCC Supp. 1967). New
Mexico and Washington have eliminated deficiency judgments in consumer transactions. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50A-9-504(2) (1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A
North Carolina has a detailed, but non-mandatory procedure for
9-501(1) (1967).
Rhode Island restricts the type
public sale. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9.601 (1967).
of cross collateral clauses that will be enforced. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 6A-9-503.1

(1971).
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mum to a recovery equal to the amount of the credit service charge
plus ten percent of the principal amount of the debt. In some cases,
for instance where public sale was not conducted in a commercially
reasonable manner, the actual loss and thus the recovery, would
be the difference between the true value of the goods and the
amount actually realized.2 4 In cases of technical non-compliance,
it would seem that the debtor could show little or no loss arising
from the failure to comply with the Part 5 procedures. Nonetheless, most courts have not required the debtor to prove whether or
not a loss was caused by failure to comply, either by shifting the
burden of proof with regard to loss to the creditor, or else on the
theory that repossession or sale not in technical compliance with the
UCC constitutes conversion. 25 As a practical matter, therefore, the
debtor is entitled to the true value of the goods sold in all cases
where the creditor has failed to comply with the Code procedures.
The UCC says nothing about how the creditor's failure to comply with repossession or resale procedures affects his right to a deficiency. One could argue with considerable force that section 9-507
is exclusive, that is, that the sole consequence of failure to comply
with UCC procedures is the damage remedy.26 However most
courts have held that the right to a deficiency judgment is conditional upon complete compliance,2 7 a result approved of by Professor Gilmore, reporter for Article 9.28
Finally, while the Code adopts freedom of contract as its keystone, or at least one of its principal cornerstones, 9 in most respects
the enforcement scheme of Part 5 of Article 9 prior to default is
24 As Professor Gilmore put it with his characteristic wit, "the difference between
the amount for which the secured party sold the collateral and its fair or true or real
value, determined by jury-guess or by some other comparably scientific method." 2 G.
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.9.2 (1965).

25

See, e.g., Carter v. Ryburn Ford Sales Inc., 248 Ark. 236, 451 S.W.2d 199

(1970); Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, 398 S.W.2d 538
(1966); Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (D.C.

1971).
26

See Hogan, Pitfials in Default Procedure, 2 U.C.C.L.J. 244, 257 (1970).
See, e.g., Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa.
1963), rev'd in part, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cit. 1964); Edmondson v. Air Serv. Co., 123
Ga. App. 263, 180 S.E.2d 589 (1971); Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App.
699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968); Associates Discount Corp. v. Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262
N.Y.S.2d 646 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1965).
28 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 24, § 44.9.4. But an amicus curiae brief filed by the
Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC in Norton argued contrary to this conclusion. See
1 P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGrs, SEcuRED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 8.06 (1963).
29
UCC § 1-102(3).
27
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not subject to significant variation by agreement. 0 In any event,
most of the commonly-used forms for consumer credit contracts do
little more than restate the Code scheme, sometimes merely by a
cross reference.
While this is, of course, an oversimplified picture of the status
of secured creditors' remedies under Article 9 of the UCC, it will
be helpful to have this outline in mind as we consider the impact
of recent constitutional developments. It should be noted that from
the creditor's viewpoint, the remedies of the UCC were a significant
improvement over previous laws, such as the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act.3
The problem with the scheme that concerns us here is that the
consumer debtor is usually deprived of the use of the goods before
he has had an opportunity to contest or even question the merits of
the creditor's right to repossession. Private repossession by definition provides no opportunity for a hearing, and the typical state replevin procedure allows the debtor to recover his 'goods pending
resolution of the merits of the creditors' claims only by posting a
counterbond, a requirement that many poor consumers are unable
to satisfy or even understand.3 2
While it is probable that in most cases the consumer is in fact
in default and the creditor is entitled to repossess, this certainly is
not always true. A recent elaborate study of the reasons for consumer debtors defaulting indicates that about a third give reasons
for their ceasing to pay which implicate the creditor in some way
or other - principally fraud or misrepresentations concerning
the goods. 3 While not all debtor complaints are legitimate, or, if
8Old. § 9-501(3).
31 The UCC's looseness and lack of formalities in the foreclosure procedure is in
sharp contrast to the detail of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (UCSA) which governed the creditor's remedies in a number of states prior to the UCC. The UCSA,
which generally required public sale at an auction with detailed notice requirements,
was generally thought to be unsatisfactory from the point of view of all parties. It was
difficult for creditors to insure that they had complied with all the terms of the statute,
and the public sale at auction generally realized substantially less than the true value
of the goods. All too often the result was either an unnecessarily large deficiency judgment or "a sort of strict foreclosure with attorney's fees on both sides." 2 G. GILMoRE,
supra note 24, § 44A at 1228. On the other hand, the UCSA provided for preseizure
notice which, if given by the creditor, cut off the debtor's right of redemption. This
procedure for formal notice prior to repossession was intended to stimulate the buyer
into performing the contract. Whether or not it realized the purpose, the preseizure
notice might have avoided some of the constitutional problems raised by FuenteJ.
32 See note 16 supra.
331 D. CAPLOVITZ, DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 4-8, 4-12 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as CAPLOVITZ]. See also Note, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts from
High Risk Credit Buyers in Los Angeles - Alternative Methods for Allocating Present
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legitimate, sufficient to justify a cessation of payment, it nevertheless seems likely that there is a significant percentage of cases where
the debtor has a good defense and the creditor has no legal right
to repossess.
B. Variations of the Pattern:Retail Sales Acts and
Other Consumer Credit Legislation
Article 9 of the UCC is a general statute governing all security
interests in personal property, whether the goods be a $10 million
steam shovel or a $15 radio, and whether the debtor be General
Motors or Joe Schmoe. But, it is clear that the draftsmen were more
concerned with General Motors and the steam shovel than they were
with Joe Schmoe and his radio. 4 Although there are a number of
references in the UCC to consumers and consumer goods, the Code
in general does not address itself to the particular problems of consumer goods financing. At one time in the drafting of Article 9
a separate part was planned to deal specifically with consumer credit, and the problems discussed here might have been dealt with by
that part.85 In any event such consumer credit legislation would
necessarily be controversial if it were to deal in any adequate way
with the serious problems involved, and it apparently was dropped
for political reasons.8 6 A judgment was made to first bring order
to the existing chaos in commercial law, particularly with respect
to personal property security interests, and this no doubt was wise.
The controversy currently raging over the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, hardly a radical document, suggests that we might still be
fighting about whether a transaction was a chattel mortgage or a
conditional sale if the original plan to adopt the consumer credit
part had been carried out.
Meanwhile, and in fact long before the UCC was widely
adopted, the states were enacting a variety of statutes governing different segments of consumer credit, and the UCC is expressly made
subject to these statutes.8 7 Most of these statutes, however, have
88
little or nothing to say about secured creditors' remedies.
Costs, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 879 (1967), for a less elaborate study also indicating substantial numbers of default judgments against consumers having legal defenses.
34

For a good criticism of Article 9 of the UCC as applied to consumers see Clark,

Default, Repossession, Foreclosure, and Deficiency: A journey to the Underworld and
a ProposedSalvation, 51 ORE. L. REv. 302 (1972).
35 The history is recounted in 1 G. GILMORE supra note 24 § 9.2.
36 Id.

37 UCC § 9-203 (2).
38

B. Ct3RAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER LEGISLATiON 110 at n. 232 (1965).
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The retail installment sales acts, which most states have adopted,
do sometimes regulate the enforcement of security interests, for instance, by restricting or eliminating deficiency judgments,39 voiding
accelleration clauses,4" and prescribing procedures for foreclosure
sales. 4 These acts frequently apply only to certain classes of goods
such as motor vehicles.4 ' None that I am aware of significantly affect the creditor's repossession rights or procedures. Some statutes,
however, do prohibit contract clauses giving the creditor the right
to enter the debtor's premises or breach the peace in repossession,4 3
and some require or encourage notice prior to repossession."
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), now adopted in
six states and being considered by most of the others, eliminates deficiency judgments in the case of goods sold for $1,000 or less but
does not otherwise change the UCC scheme.4 5 A preliminary working draft for a revision of the UCCC would, however, make three
significant modifications of the UCC scheme of secured creditors'
remedies :46 It would substantially restrict the operation of acceleration clauses ;47 it would require the creditor to give the debtor at
least 20 days notice of default prior to repossession; 48 and it would
permit self-help repossession only "if possession can be taken without entry into a dwelling and without the use of force or other
breach of peace. '4' These proposed amendments to the UCCC result in part from criticism made by the National Consumer Law
Center, the sponsor of the rival National Consumer Act (NCA).50
Whereas the UCCC eschewed any attempt to reform the repossession scheme of the Commercial Code, the NCA completely rewrites the remedies of the secured creditor in consumer transactions
by severely restricting acceleration clauses and permitting a debtor
39See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.5 (West Supp. 1972).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 142 (1969).

40

41

CONN.GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-98 d (1958).
See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 601-37 (Purdon 1965).
43
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 4 4 5.8 6 4 (c) (1967).
44
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 255D, §§ 21, 22 (Supp. 1972).
42

45 UCCC § 5.103.
46 Working Redraft No. 3.
This proposal is in a preliminary stage of drafting
and consideration. It has not been approved or considered by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws or even approved by its UCCC Committee.
47 UCCC § 5.111 (Working Redraft No. 3, 1972).
48Id.
49Id. § 5-112.
50 The references here will be to the First Final Draft, available from ti.. .;acinal
Consumer Law Center, Boston College Law School. The NCA has not beeo adopted
in any state. Only Wisconsin has adopted a version of the NCA.
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to halt repossession at any time by tendering overdue installments."
In addition, the debtor could not be declared in default until he is
three installments in arrears.5 2 Repossession would only be effected by legal process and then not until fifteen days after the
debtor has been served with a copy of a complaint setting forth the
nature of the default, the amounts overdue, and so forth.53 During this 15-day period the debtor may demand an expedited preliminary hearing on the merits.5 4 If the consumer raises "substantial
doubts" at the hearing, repossession is stayed until a final full hearing on the merits.55 After the fifteen days or a preliminary hearing
at which the debtor fails to raise a substantial doubt, the goods can
be seized by judicial process. The NCA also restricts deficiency
judgments in a manner similar to the UCCC.56 The debtor can
force the creditor into strict foreclosure whether he likes it or not
and regardless of the value of the goods by merely tendering return of the goods.57 Finally, the debtor's right to redeem after repossession is considerably broadened.5"
While the NCA appears radical in its approach to the consumersecured creditor problem, it does offer some valuable suggestions,
as indicated by the reaction of the UCCC Committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The
20-day notice before repossession provision is of particular interest
in that it may arguably provide a solution to the constitutional problems which are discussed in detail below.

III. DuE

PROCESS LIMITATIONS ON THE

REPOSSESSION REMEDY

A.

The Sniadach and Fuentes Decisions

Normally, before resorting to repossession or formal legal processes, a creditor will first seek payment by some informal method
of persuasion, such as telephone calls or correspondence, or by negotiations to reschedule repayments or reduce the size of install51

NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT
52 Id. § 5.103(1).

§ 5.207 [hereinafter cited as NCAJ.

53 d. §§ 5.204, .206.
54 Id.

§ 5.208(1).
551d. § 5.208(2).
56M. § 5.211. However the NCA's limitation is based on the unpaid balance as
opposed to the original price.
57 Id. § 5.205.

581d. § 5.209.
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ments5 0 Studies have indicated that most debtors, even most of
those who feel they did not receive a fair deal initially, want to
pay.60 Thus most creditors, in their efforts to maximize profits, do
better by first exhausting their power of informal persuasion, including threats of repossession and garnishment, before resorting to
the more expensive remedies of repossession or the legal process.
While this may be the normal pattern, there is ample evidence
that some creditors in some cities resort to repossession and legal process without any serious efforts to work something out with the
debtor. And some who work out an arrangement with debtors
change their minds and proceed with repossession and legal process. 6 Both the usual pattern of collection practices and deviations
from that pattern should be kept in mind in appraising the application of the constitutional guarantee of due process to the collection
process.
While the constitutional attacks on creditors might seem to have
started with Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,6 in a real sense
Sniadach does not mark a radical departure in constitutional adjudication. It is ... but a part of the mainstream of past procedural
due process decisions of the United States Supreme Court.""3
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract
words of the due process clause but there can be no doubt that at
a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property
by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
64
appropriate to the nature of the case.

In Sniadach, the Family Finance Corporation had instituted a
garnishment action in a Wisconsin state court. The Wisconsin
59 See Note, supra note 33, at 885-88, describing California practice. See also
Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971). California
practice may be atypical because a creditor upon repossession is denied the right to a
deficiency judgment with respect to all goods but automobiles, CAL. CIv. CODE § 1812.5
(West Supp. 1972). Some of the less pleasant, informal means of persuasion are
described in 2 CAPLOVITZ, supra note 33, at ch. 10.
60 See 1 CAPLOVITZ, supra note 33, at ch. 4; and Note, supra note 33, at 894
(1961), where the authors conclude on the basis of interviews with creditors, that most
defaulting debtors want to pay, but are unable to do so. Of course, the motive here
may be principally the desire to retain an acceptable credit rating.
61
See 1 CAPLOVITZ, supra note 33, at ch. 4.
62 3 9 5 U.S. 337 (1969).
63
Randone v. App. Dep't of Sup. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 550, 536 P.2d 13, 22, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709, 718 (1971), quoted in Fuentes v, Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 88 n.19 (1972).
64 Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1949).
For a frequently cited earlier affirmation of this principle, see Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works,
237 U.S. 413 (1915). See also Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
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procedure permitted a creditor to freeze an alleged debtor's wages
by merely serving a summons and complaint upon the alleged debtor's employer and than, within ten days, serving the debtor himself
with a complaint. The clerk of court issued the summons at the
request of the creditor's lawyer without notice to the debtor, without any opportunity for the debtor to be heard, and without any
scrutiny by a judge or other public official of the merits of the creditor's claims. The debtor's wages remained frozen until a decision
at the trial on the merits, although it was possible for the debtor
to have the garnishment lifted prior to trial if he could show the suit
was brought in bad faith."5 Presumably this would be by motion or
an order to show cause procedure to dismiss the garnishment action, the method by which Sniadach arose and reached the United
States Supreme Court. The alleged debtor could also have the garnishment lifted by posting a bond.
A divided Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the lower
court's holding that the Wisconsin prejudgment garnishment procedure was constitutional. The United States Supreme Court reversed, with Justice Black dissenting. Justice Douglas's opinion for
the majority stressed that wages are "a specialized type of property
presenting distinct problems in our economic system." 6 6 The freezing of wages which the debtor relies upon for the basic daily needs
of himself and his family, "may as a practical matter drive a wageearning family to the wall as well as perhaps cause the loss of his
employment."6 7 With such leverage the creditor could' force the
68
wage earner to pay whether he has a defense or not.
6
5The availability of this remedy was questioned by Justice Harlan in his Sniadach
concurrence. 395 U.S. at 343.

6Id. at 340.
67 Id. at 341.
68justice Douglas at this point quoted from the congressional debates over the

Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 suggesting that the debt is frequently a fraudulent one. Id. at 341.

It should be noted that Wisconsin did exempt from garnishment a portion of the
defendants wages, presumably on the theory that one should not be left without a subsistence income. Although more generous than some state exemption statutes, the exemption was dearly inadequate given the degree of inflation since the statute was

enacted.

Existing state wage garnishment statutes are described in Note, Federal Re-

strictions of Wage Garnishments: Title III of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 44
IND. LJ.267, 290 (1969).

The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968 (CCPA) exempts from garnishment
wages amounting to 25 percent of disposable weekly earnings or 30 times the federal
minimum hourly wage, whichever is larger. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (1970). This pre-

sumably reflects a congressional judgment as to subsistence wages, although there is no
adjustment for variation in family size. The CCPA was not in effect at the time Snia-
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Justice Harlan's concurring opinion did not rely on the specialized type of property theory of Justice Douglas but was instead based
upon the broader principle that the use of the garnished portion of
wages is property and that the deprivation pending the resolution of
the suit on the merits was not de minimis.69 Thus the defendant
was deprived of property without notice and without a prior hearing, a violation of the "norms of 'fundamental fairness'" found in
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It was the temporary nature of the deprivation in Sniadach that made new law,
the holding that "due process requires a prior hearing even when
the taking is relatively brief and an eventual hearing is guaranteed."7 0
While the principles applied in Sniadach had ancient antecedents
and many contemporary applications, it was necessary for the Court
to deal with a number of its past decisions where it had approved
of ex parte prejudgment seizures of property. Justice Douglas'
opinion did so, obliquely stating merely that "such summary procedure may well meet the requirements of due process in extraordinary situations,''71 citing four such cases and noting that the Wisconsin statute was not in any event narrowly drawn to meet only
72
extraordinary situations.
dach arose, but it would seem to be relevant to Justice Douglas' argument concerning
the undue pressure put upon the debtor.
69 In Sniadach six weeks lapsed between the service of the garnishment and the
lower court's denial of the defendant's motion to remove the garnishment. Some of
the delay was attributed to the debtor. 37 Wis. 2d 163, 165-166, 154 N.W.2d 259,
260-61 (1967).
"oAaron v. Clark, 342 F. Supp. 898, 900 (N.D. Ga. 1972). See also The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV.L. REV. 7, 114 (1969).
71 395 U.S. at 339.
72The cases cited were Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950)
involving multiple seizures by the Food and Drug Administration of misbranded drugs;
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) involving the summary appointment of a
conservator for a savings and loan association by the Federal Home Loan Administration;
Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) involving an assessment by a state bank
supervisor against stockholders of an insolvent bank; and Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S.
94 (1921) involving prejudgment attachment of a non-resident defendant's property
perhaps necessary for jurisdiction in pre-long arm days. The first two cases involved
governmental actions where there was, arguably, great and immediate danger to the
public. Ownbey involved a special situation and possibly is still good law under some
conditions. See Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (ED. Pa.
1971). Coffin Bros. did not involve taking of property prior to hearing. The court
might have cited other cases involving governmental action. See, e.g., Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931). See also cases cited in Kennedy, Due Process Limitations on Creditors' Remedies: Some Reflections on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
19 AM. U. L. REV. 158, 160 n.9 (1970).
The Sniadach court later cited McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1928), a per
curiam affirmance of a decision upholding prejudgment attachment. Justice Douglas
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Although Douglas' opinion seems limited to wages, Sniadach has
since been widely used with varying success in attempts to overturn
diverse procedures that involve the temporary denial of a property
interest. As a later court put it, "Sniadach's seed has been scattered
by the winds. ' 73 Among the procedures that have been attacked on
the basis of Sniadach are: eviction of a lessee;74 exercise of a land78
lord's right of distraint and sale; 75 exercise of an innkeeper's lien;
real estate mortgage foreclosure; 77 attachment of real estate;78 attachment of bank accounts;79 foreclosure of a warehousemen's lien
under Article 7 of the UCC; 80 enforcement of confession of judgment clauses; 81 termination of services by a public utility; " and, on
point for our purposes, replevin and self-help repossession under the
UCC.u The results and the language in these cases are by no means
all reconcilable. In the cases upholding summary procedures, Sniadach has been distinguished on a number of grounds, most frequently on the nature of the property affected; that is, whether the property falls within a special category as Justice Douglas argued wages
did in Sniadach.8 4 More often this distinction has been rejected in
favor of the broader rationale of Harlan's concurrence.85
This last term the Supreme Court resolved a split among the cir-

dismissed McKay by observing: "A procedural rule that may satisfy due process attachments in general .... does not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case."
395 U.S. at 340. McKay might be explained on the basis that the defendant was not
deprived of the use of the property attached: real estate and securities.
7
3 Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing and Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335, 1337 (1971).
74
Mihans v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1970) (held
unconstitutional).
" 5 Musselman v. Spies, 343 F. Supp. 528 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Santiago v. McElroy,
319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (held unconstitutional).
76 Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109
(N.D. Cal. 1970) (held unconstitutional).
77Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970) (held constitutional).
78
Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971) (held
constitutional).
7
9 Randone v. App. Dep't of Sup. Ct, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr.
709 (1971) (held unconstitutional).
8
°Magro v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (held constitutional).
8
1 Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D.Del. 1971) (held unconstitutional).
82
Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (held unconstitutional).
83
See cases cited note 11 supra.
84
See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. J & P Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
85
See, e.g., Blair v. Pitchess, 5 CaL 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42
(1971).
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cuit courts in Fuentes v. Shevin, 8' and held that summary seizure of
personal property by means of the typical replevin procedure described earlier violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.8 7 Between Sniadach and Fuentes the Court had, in
several significant decisions, applied the fundamental due process
principle recognized in Sniadach. These cases relied to some extent
upon Sniadach, but did not go beyond ancient and often affirmed
principles of fairness in procedural due process. And in a sense
these-cases did little to clarify the scope of Sniadach.
In Goldberg v. Kelly8 8 the Court declared that New York could
not cut off welfare payments without notice and an opportunity for
a hearing. In Bell v. Burson8 9 the Court held that a state could not
suspend a driver's license without similar minimum procedural safeguards. Goldberg involved welfare payments which the Court, relying in part on the Sniadach rationale, noted were as essential to
life as wages. On the other hand, Goldberg went beyond Sniadach
since the initial decision to terminate benefits was made by a presumably well-intentioned governmental official, and since in Goldberg the extortion feature of prejudgment garnishment was absent.
In Bell the Court noted that the use of an automobile may also be
as essential to subsistence as wages, since it is often the only form of
transportation to the job where those wages are earned.
Another important Supreme Court decision coming between
Sniadach and Fuentes was D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,90 in
which the Court held that confession of judgment clauses were not
per se unconstitutional. In Overmyer, there was equal bargaining
power and the waiver was negotiated between commercial parties
and was knowingly and intelligently made. I shall have more to
say about Overmyer later. For now it is enough to note that it reaffirmed the basic requirement of notice and hearing for even provisional remedies."
86407 U.S. 67 (1972).
87 The Pennsylvania procedure involved in Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127
(E.D. Pa. 1971), one of the cases reversed in Fuentes, was in a sense nonjudicial. A
party seeking repossession in Pennsylvania need not initiate court action. Ihe writ
issues from a prothonotary upon the mere filing of a bond and an affidavit regarding
the value of the property to be seized. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 77 (1972).
88397 U.S. 254 (1970).
89402 U.S. 535 (1971).
00405 U.S. 174 (1972).
91 A cognovit judgment is provisional in the sense that the judgment debtor can
usually reopen the judgment with little more than a allegation that he has a colorable
defense.
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Against this background the Fuentes Court considered the replevin procedures of Florida and Pennsylvania. As described
earlier, replevin typically requires the creditor to file a bond and an
affidavit indicating his right to possession. Without intervention of
the Court and without any notice to the debtor or opportunity for a
hearing, the sheriff or some similar official seizes the property.
Pending final disposition of the merits, the alleged debtor cannot
recover his property unless he posts a counterbond, usually in an
amount twice the value of the property seized. The majority of the
Court in Fuentes, through an opinion by Justice Stewart, found
these procedures unconstitutional on the basis of a broadly stated
concept of due process reminiscent of Harlan's concurrence in
Sniadach. Douglas' reliance upon the specialized nature of wages as
a basis for Sniadach was expressly discarded.92 Such a distinction
between necessities and non-necessities was quite rightly found to
be unworkable and inconsistent with a respect for "an individual's
choices in the marketplace ... ""
The fact that the defendant could have recovered his goods
prior to resolution of the merits of the. case, Justice Stewart said, was
irrelevant because of the burden of the counterbond requirement. 4
Thus the Court remained consistent with a number of recent rulings
striking down filing fees as unconstitutional prerequisites to justice.9 5
The retail installment sales contracts involved in all but one of
the cases consolidated in Fuentes 6 contained clauses stating that "in
the event of default of any payment or payments, Seller at its option may take back the merchandise" or similar language. The
creditors argued that this amounted to a waiver of any constitutional
rights to a pre-seizure hearing. While expressing doubts about the
effectiveness of waivers in adhesion contracts, Justice Stewart lim92 The Court did not consider the debtors' challenge of prejudgment replevin under
the fourth amendment search and seizure provision, made applicable to the states by
the fourteenth amendment. The debtors' arguments are described in Abbott & Peters,
supra note 17, at 984-90. Both Blair v. Pritchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96
Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971), and Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716
(N.DN.Y. 1970) finding summary seizure in replevin actions unconstitutional, were
based at least as much on the search and seizure issue as the due process issue. Any
hearing that would satisfy the due process clause would also no doubt satisfy the fourth
amendment. Wheeler v. Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645, 657 (D. Md. 1971).
93 407 U.S. at 90.

941d. at 84-86.
95
See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
96 One of the cases involved a domestic dispute over rights to custody of a son and
possession of his personal property.
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ited his ruling to the particular contract language used, which did
not clearly express a waiver and therefore was held not to be considered as a waiver of the buyer's rights to a preseizure hearingY
Justice White wrote a short dissenting opinion in which Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. That dissenting opinion, and the criticisms which it contains, have a special significance,
for in one sense Fuentes was a minority decision. The vote was
four to three, with Justices Powell and Rehnquist, who had just been
appointed at least in part because of their conservative views, not
participating. 98 The recent dramatic change in the composition of
the Court and the current Court's surprisingly attenuated treatment of
its own recent precedents, 9 make even less certain the life span and
future influence of Fuentes. In this light, the soundness of the dissent becomes relevant as perhaps an indication of the Court's future
attitude.
The dissent noted that the seller retaining a security interest has
an "interest" in the property, just as the buyer has, and went on to
state that "[i]n considering whether this resolution of conflicting
interests is unconstitutional, much depends on one's perceptions of
the practical considerations involved."' 00 Most creditors, the dissent thought, prefer the transaction to go forward and be completed as planned. Creditors ordinarily do not attempt to repossess
unless they in good faith believe there is a default. Since it is in both
parties' interest to repossess only in the case of a true default, there
will likely be few cases of unjust repossession. In fact, in one of
the cases consolidated by the Court in Fuentes, the debtor had conceded default. 10 Since the creditor has a property interest in the
goods which might be injured by the debtor's continued use pending resolution of the merits, there is danger that the creditor will be
97 Some of the debtors could have argued that the waiver was only effective if they
were in default, and since they claimed there was no default, there could be no waiver.
See Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954, 957 (S.D. Fla. 1970). This argument
could not be made by those debtors in Fuentes who admitted to being in default.
98
Labeling Supreme Court justices is a hazardous business, particularly so early in
their term of office. In any event, Justice Powell, if not Justice Rehnquist, may well
prove to be a judicial conservative of the Frankfurter-Harlan variety; given his opinion
in Sniadach, Justice Harlan would probably have concurred in Fuentes.
99 See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
100 407 U.S. at 100.
101 Although Justice White's dissent says that one other of the debtors in Fuentes
had conceded default, 407 U.S. at 101 n.*, this is inaccurate. The appellant Fuentes
and defendants stipulated that payments had not been made, but Mrs. Feuntes had asserted defenses which should have entitled her to withhold payment. Abbott & Peters,
supra note 17, at 990-92.
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harmed by the delay if a hearing is required. Since it is unlikely
that creditors will abuse the process, there is little danger that debtors will be harmed by the current replevin practice.
Finally, the dissent styled the Court's ruling as "no more than
ideological tinkering with state law."10 2 Assuming the limited
holding on the waiver point, the dissent suggested that creditors
need only redraft their forms or, alternatively, that if a hearing
were held, the creditor would generally be able to show probable
cause and the debtor would be no more protected than under current procedures. The end result, in the opinion of the dissent, is
an additional expense which might affect the availability or cost of
consumer credit.
B. A Critique of the Fuentes Rationale
1. Specialized Property.- By the time the Court heard Fuentes,
it had begun to appear that the "specialized type of property" rationale of Justice Douglas in Sniadach would not bear close analysis
and in any event had not proved workable in practice. Some forms
of property could easily be classified as necessities of life, and therefore within the specialized property rationale. For instance, bank
checking accounts, which for many contain little more than deposited wages from the most recent paycheck, quite sensibly have been
held to be specialized property for due process purposes. 0 3 Some
household items such as beds and stoves have also understandably
been included. 4 Other consumer goods such as television sets, hifidelity equipment and the like have given the courts more difficulty;
some found them to be necessities of the modern American family,
while others insisted that they are luxuries and therefore outside the
Sniadach rule. 0 5 Automobiles, probably the most frequent object
of repossession, are often a prerequisite to earning the wages Justice
Douglas deemed essential. Bell v. Burson,0 where the Supreme
Court held the suspension of a driver's license without an adequate
102
03

407 U.S. at 102.

See, e.g., Scott v. Danaher, 343 F.Supp. 1272 (N.D. I1. 1972); Aaron v. Clark,
342 F. Supp. 898 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488
P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971); and Stillwater, The California Banker's Lien Law:
A Reappraisal of a Creditor's Remedy in a New Economic Context, 27 Bus. L. 777
(1972). Contra,Michael's Jewelers v. Handy, 6 Conn. 103, 266 A.2d 904 (1969).
104Compare Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd sub nom.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), with Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315
F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
10 5 See cases cited note 104 supra.
106402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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hearing violated due process, might be explained on that basis. 107
There the use of the automobile was important to the petitioner's
proper performance of his job as a clergyman, although the Court
made no special point of it and it is unlikely that a clergyman would
lose any income pending a hearing. Presumably, tools of trade
would be included for the same reason. 10 8 Tools of trade are essential to the earning of wages, the loss of which, even for a short
interval, Justice Douglas thought so critical to the average person.
Thus, the concept of a "specialized type of property" lent itself to
what was in essence the case-by-case development of a class of partially exempt property - property subject to attachment or seizure
but not without a hearing. While no doubt feasible, at least if done
by means of general categories rather than entirely case by case, 109
it does not seem worth the expenditure of our already over-extended
judicial resources to determine the nature of each article of consumer property. As with most things it is a matter of degree." 0
However, the prospect of the Supreme Court reconciling the inevitable conflicts among the lower courts over the proper category for a
washing machine, dishwasher, or sewing machine seems a terrible
waste of everyone's time. The Court should not get involved in
subtle distinctions where the interests at stake are not significant.
As I shall show, the costs to the creditor of requiring notice and opportunity for a hearing will not be great. On the other hand, for
at least some debtors the temporary deprivation of property may be
a significant hardship, and one which does not lend itself to legal
recompensation. While the dissent in Fuentes may disagree with
this assessment of the importance of the interests, it would seem
that the creditors, when seeking the assistance of the coercive power
of the state, should have the burden of proof in the matter.
Aside from these practical objections, the notion of "specialized
0 7

1

108

But see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 89, 90.
Cedar Rapids Eng'r Co. v. Haenelt, 68 Misc. 2d 206, 326 N.Y.S.2d 653 (Sup.

Ct. 1971).
109 E.g., automobiles could be deemed specialized regardless of whether essential

to the particular defendant. State exemption laws offer some guide and the concept
of "necessities" is no stranger to the law. See Annot., 41 A.LR.3d 607 (1972); Annot.,
65 A.L.R. 1337 (1930). The standards for determining necessaries in the various contexts, however, may differ.
110 In addition to the coercive factor, some commentators have thought "necessities"
a special case in that they are unlikely to be destroyed or moved in order to defraud
the creditor. See Note, Attachment and Garnishment - Constitutional Law - Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment Is a Denial of Due Process: The Snaidach Case
and Its Implications for Related Areas of Law, 68 MicH. L. REv. 986, 1001 (1970);
and The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 117 (1969).
This factor

would only slightly weaken the criticism in the text.
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property" presents conceptual problems. Even in the clearest cases
of luxury consumer items, the leverage which Justice Douglas found
to be so strong in the case of necessities is often present to some degree. One reason for this is that the goods repossessed may well
be worth much more to the consumer than they are likely to bring
at even an efficiently conducted foreclosure sale,"' particularly when
the debtor has to pay for the cost of the repossession and sale." 2
It follows that, at least with respect to consumer goods, there
ought to be a single rule with regard to preseizure hearings. If due
process requires a hearing in the case of necessities, the most sensible rule is to require a hearing in all cases of consumer goods, which
is, of course, the holding in Fuentes."'
Thus, the narrow holding of Justice Douglas's opinion in Sniadach would not likely survive regardless of how restrictive the Court
might later interpret Fuentes. This leaves us with the broader principle of Sniadach found in Justice Harlan's concurrence, which is
that "some form of notice and hearing - formal or informal - is
required before deprivation of a property interest that cannot be
' 4 Once this principle is accepted,
characterized as de minimis.""
Fuentes is an easy case except for the problem of the contractual
waiver.
2. Waiver.- Since the majority opinion in Fuentes resolved
the waiver problem by simply adopting a narrow reading of the contract language, the question arises whether creditors may overcome
future difficulty by redrafting their contracts as suggested by the
dissent. It seems clear enough from Overmyer, which held a confession of judgment provision not per se unconstitutional, that it is
possible for a waiver of rights to notice and opportunity for a hear111 "The concourse of bidders at the typical foreclosure sale, be it ever so 'public,'
is apt to be about as lively as a group of mourners at a funeral." 2 G. GILMOE,
SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.6, at 1242 (1965).
12 For instance, a repossessed automobile in the best of circumstances is likely to
sell for less than a comparable used automobile that has not been repossessed due to
the "dead beat discount." See Clark, supra note 34, at 305. See also Leff, Injury, Ignoranceand Spite - The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE LJ. 1, 12 (1970).
That is, the debtor's replacement cost of the automobile will be greater than the amount
realized at a fair foreclosure sale and he will have to pay the costs of the repossession
and resale as well.
13 While the concern here is strictly with consumer transactions, there is good
reason for applying the broad Sniadach principle to commercial cases. Compare Jones
Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Serv. Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970), with
Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424 P.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970). The pressure for
unfair settlements and the impact of the temporary deprivation could be equally disasterous in either consumer or commercial transactions. The principal distinction between the two situations lies in the effectiveness of the contractual waiver.
14 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.21 (1972).
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ing to be valid if the parties intelligently, knowingly, and fairly
bargain for such terms." 5 Overmyer, however, on its facts is about
the strongest conceivable case for enforcing contract terms waiving constitutional rights. There the parties had revised and negotiated a new agreement twice after the debtor had defaulted on the
original agreement. The cognovit provision did not appear until
the second revision. The parties were both relatively sophisticated
businesses represented by attorneys, and the creditor's need for a
cognovit provision was understandable. Swarb v. Lennox," 6 the
companion case to Overmyer, is not so easily explained. There consumer plaintiffs sought to have the Pennsylvania statute authorizing
cognovit clauses declared unconstitutional on its face. This the
Court held it could not do and remain consistent with Overmyer."7
Swarb suggests that the Pennsylvania and Florida summary seizure
procedures in replevin actions may not be altogether invalid. They
still may be available where the parties have in fact knowingly and
intelligently bargained for a waiver of the right to a hearing." 8
How this would work in practice, however, is troublesome. How
is the court or the sheriff to know that the waiver has been bargained for knowingly and intelligently, and is therefore valid, unless
some sort of hearing is held? While this problem was also presented
in Swarb and was argued by the petitioners in that case, it had no effect on the decision." 9
The case of a cognovit clause is analogous to replevin. While a
cognovit judgment itself does not deprive the defendant of any
property, once such a judgment is entered, execution can issue without notice or hearing and the debtor's property can be levied upon
and seized or his wages and property garnished. 20 Thus a confes"1 See also National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964);
and The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).

116405 U.S. 191 (1972).
117 It is worth noting that in Overmyer the Court refused to rule on the challenged
procedure on its face whereas it did so in Sniadach and, at least as to consumer debtors
in Fuentes, even though in Sniadach and Fuentes the petitioners, or some of them,
were concededly in default and thus not deprived of any property to which they were
entitled.
118The Supreme Court did not mention this possibility. The Supreme Court of
California in Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971)
recognized the issue but held that the statute was not salvageable. See also Thorp
Credit Inc. v. Barr, 41 U.S.L.W. 2205 (Iowa Sup. Ct. Sept. 19, 1972).
11) 40 U.S.L.W. 3233. See also Scott v. Danaher, 343 F- Supp. 1272 (N.D. Ill.
1972); Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1359 (D. Del. 1971).
120 This is the rationale for the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation under the
CCPA equating a cognovit note with a note granting a lien on the debtor's real prop-
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sion of judgment clause may, as a practical matter, implicitly indude a waiver of Sniadach rights regarding wage garnishments and
a waiver of Fuentes rights regarding replevin. 2' Furthermore, deprivation of the debtor's property by means of a cognovit judgment in conjunction with the post-judgment collection devices such
as garnishment and levy upon the debtor's property is, like replevin,
temporary, for generally cognovit judgments can be reopened by
a mere motion showing that the alleged debtor has a colorable defense to the action. 22
In any event, voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waivers of
rights rarely if ever happen in consumer credit sales transactions.
For good reasons, 123 consumer credit transactions are carried out by
printed standard-form contracts, often with substantially similar
terms regardless of the seller or lender. Even if the consumer were
to read and understand the terms, which is unlikely, there is almost
never any opportunity for bargaining about terms other than the
interest rate and the payment terms. The normal consumer credit
contract is the archetypal contract of adhesion 24 in which there is
no meaningful assent to the specific terms of the contract. 25 Apart
from the questionable "conscionability" under UCC section 2-302
of a term purporting to waive a debtor's Fuentes rights, creditors
would not and should not be able to extract by means of a printed
form a waiver of the constitutionally-protected right to a preseizure
hearing.
This conclusion is strongly supported by Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Overmyer where he stated that the Court's "holding, of course, is not controlling precedent for other facts of other
erty. 12 C.F.R. § 226.9 (1971). See also Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D.
Ill.
1972), which held unconstitutional a post-cognovit judgment garnishment.
The statement in the text is not accurate as applied to Ohio procedure which requires notice to the judgment debtor before execution can issue. OHIO REV. CODE
§ 2323.13 (Page 1970). The Wisconsin statute is similar. Wis. STAT. ANN. §
270.69 (Supp. 1972-73). See Note, Consumer Protection - Truth in Lending and
the Cognovit Judgment, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 216 (1970).
121 Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1271 (N.D. Ill.
1972) held that garnishment
without notice following a cognovit judgment was unconstitutional under Sniadach.
122 This is not true of the Pennsylvania cognovit procedure since the entry of the
judgment shifts the burden of proof to the judgment debtor. Swatb v. Lennox, 314

F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
12 3 See generally Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L REV. 529 (1971); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV.
L. REV. 700, 701 (1939).
124 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943), is the leading early article on the subject.
125 There is, of course, assent to such terms as price and terms of payment, but
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cases. For example, where the contract is one of adhesion, where
there is great disparity in bargaining power, and where the debtor
receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other legal consequences may ensue." 12 This conclusion is also supported by that
portion of the district court decision in Swarb v. Lennox' holding
cognovit clauses unconstitutional as applied to the class of consumers with income under $10,000 per year.' 2 8
Most cases facing the waiver problem have applied the same standard in civil actions as applied in the criminal context, which is
that the waiver be "'voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly'
made." 2 9 While the Overmyer Court recognized a stricter standard
might be appropriate in a criminal case where personal liberty rather
than property is involved, no court has attempted to formulate or
apply a less stringent test for civil cases. Indeed, dicta in a number
of cases has indicated that "in the civil no less than the criminal
area, 'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver.' ""' While it is conceivable that the Court could decide
that even with respect to consumer credit contracts, inquiry into the
individual facts of each case will be required to determine if a waiver has been "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly" made, according to the apparent mandate applicable to commercial transactions after Overmyer, this is an unlikely and undesirable approach.
Thus, it seems likely that the small print in consumer credit standard-form contracts will not be found to waive Fuentes rights, and
the better reasoned opinions considering the question have reached
this result."'
Finally, spelling out in bold type the creditor's rights of repossession in a manner understandable to the average consumer," 2 if
126405 U.S. 173, 188 (1972).
127 314 F. Supp. 1091 (ED. Pa. 1970).
128 Limiting the decision to low-income consumers was based on the definition of
the class under FED. R. Civ. P. 23. This in turn was a result of the evidence introduced at trial; it was not a ruling that cognovits are constitutional for high-income consumers.
129D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972) quoted in Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), a criminal case, is usually cited for the same standard.
130 Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).

131 See, e.g., Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (1970); Blair
v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971). But see Fuentes
v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Brunswick Corp. v. J & P, Inc., 424
F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970). (a nonconsumer case).
132 As the Overmyer Court noted, the Ohio cognovit statute had been amended since
the transaction there in question so as to require a conspicious warning as to the nature
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that is possible, should not make any difference when the repossession provision is virtually universal in consumer credit standardform contracts. It still is a contract of adhesion whose terms were
not, and indeed could not be bargained for. Lack of notice was
not one of the factors mentioned in Justice Blackmun's caveat.
3. Bond and Counterbond.--One aspect of the due process
issue remains. Both the Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes,
as do the replevin statutes of most states, permit the defendant to
recover his property from the sheriff by posting within a relatively
short period of time (72 hours in Pennsylvania and Florida) a counterbond in the same amount as the plaintiff's bond. It might therefore be argued that since the defendant can recover his property
almost immediately by posting a bond, the deprivation of the defendant's property is so temporary as to be de minimis. The Court's
answer to this was to assert that the counterbond option merely allowed the defendant to regain his property by surrendering other
property. In many situations that answer may be adequate. For
example, in Leibowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Finance Co.,' where a
foreign attachment of a bank account could be lifted by posting a
bond, the bond would not only be costly but would also require
the depositor to put up security which would seriously affect its ability to obtain essential credit. And though posting a bond may not
always be burdensome in commercial cases, it almost certainly will
be burdensome where the debtor is an ordinary consumer. Aside
from the practical difficulties in obtaining a bond, the consumer
would probably have to put up the full value of the property seized,
or at least such was the case in Dade County Florida where one of
the Fuentes cases arose. 3 4
The counterbond does not satisfy the due process objections for
another reason that the Court impliedly recognized but did not rely
upon. At least with respect to low-income consumers with few assets, a cash bond or a bond written by a surety company will be difficult or impossible to obtain. In other contexts the Court has
found monetary prerequisites to justice unconstitutional. The case
most closely in point is Boddie v. Connecticut, r which held it violative of fourteenth amendment due process to deny a person a diof the cognovit clause. 405 U.S. at 175-76 n.1. The Court did not indicate how this
would be material.
133 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
134 Abbott & Peters, supra note 17, at 982.
135401 U.S. 371 (1971).
See also Reeves v. Motor Contract Co. of Ga., 324 F.
Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (ED. Pa. 1970).
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vorce because he is unable to pay the statutorily required costs of
giving notice. 11 6 Of course, this approach has the disadvantage of
being limited in application to indigent or relatively poor consumers. Furthermore, in Sniadach there evidently was a similar procedure for release from garnishment upon posting bond," 7 although
this bonding procedure was not mentioned in the majority opinion.
Finally, the counterbond is not in reality available to the poor
consumer and is difficult to obtain and costly for the middle-income
consumer, even if he is informed of the availability of the rem3 8 Therefore, the theoretical availability of the counterbond
edy.Y
should have no constitutional consequence with regard to the due
process objections to seizure without notice and an opportunity for
a hearing.
C. Public and CreditorInterest in Summary Replevin
Prior to Fuentes only two of the lower courts upholding replevin fully confronted the due process issue 3 ' by going beyond distinguishing Sniadach on the basis of the nature of the property involved or the contractual waiver. Both these decisions turn on the
"practical considerations involved" and attempt a "balancing of the
various interests of the State and individuals in judging whether a
particular procedural scheme or process satisfies rudimentary principles of fairness."' 40 It no doubt is true that due process determinations involve a balancing and this is recognized by the concession
of the majority opinions in both Sniadach and Fuentes that prehearing garnishment or seizure might be justified in extraordinary situations. There no doubt are extraordinary situations where creditors
can show reason to believe that the debtor is about to take some action which would cause the creditor irreparable injury, but neither
the Wisconsin garnishment procedure nor the typical replevin procedure is limited to such cases.
Nevertheless, even in the more typical cases there are legitimate
interests to be served by seizure before hearing in a replevin action,
136 Boddie, and the argument made here, might also be explained on equal protection grounds. See Justice Douglas's concurring opinion, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. at 383.
137 See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), where there was a bonding option.
138The Fuentes court seemed influenced by the debtors' evidence that the counterbond option was rarely if ever exercised. 407 U.S. at 84.
l-"Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971); and Wheeler v. Adams
Co., 322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1971).
40
1' Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127, 134 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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which interests arguably must be balanced by due process considerations. First, the prehearing seizure will usually obviate the need
for any hearing and thus "conserve State financial resources and administrative time." ' ' Even if we put aside the cases where the
debtor is so intimidated by the seizure that he fails to raise available defenses, the current evidence indicates that in most cases
where the creditor attempts to repossess he is in fact entitled to repossess and there are no defenses, or at least no defenses relevant
to the issue of who is entitled to immediate possession. 1 42 Thus the
courts and the creditors would be saved the trouble and expense of
providing for a preseizure hearing if summary replevin procedures
had been upheld, and in most cases no injustice would have been
done. The trouble with this argument is that it would apply to all
situations where due process would require a hearing. Hearings
are expensive but they are also essential to justice in the individual
case.141 "Vindication of constitutional rights cannot be made dependent on any theory that it is less expensive or more expedient
to deny them than to afford them."' 14
Moreover, there is evidence that some sellers pervert the system
and profit from default and repossession.' 45 This class of creditor,
relying on the ignorance and inertia of their customers, may have
reason to repossess where there is no legitimate default. There are
other cases where the creditor wrongfully seeks to repossess due to a
mistake, perhaps through a failure in a computer billing system.146
More common, perhaps, are the cases in which the debtor refuses
to make installment payments because of a dispute he has with the
141 Id.

142 Even the Caplovitz study mentioned earlier indicates that at least two-thirds of
defaulting debtors do so for reasons which would not constitute a defense, e.g., loss of
job and inability to pay. See 1 D. CAPLOVrz, supra note 33, ch. 4.
143
The converse of individualized judgment is adjudication by categories, e.g., most
accused criminal defendants are guilty, therefore trial is unnecessary.
144 Brennenan v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 139 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
145 Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession
and Resale, 22 STAN. L REv. 20 (1969). Doubts about the general validity of the
Shuchman study may be raised by recent studies by the National Commission on Consumer Finance. See Johnson, Creditor's Remedies and Rate Ceilings, 26 PERSONAL
FINANCE L.Q. REP. 64, 65 (1972).
Shuchman's study in Connecticut is supported by
a similar study in the District of Columbia. Note, Business as Usual: An Empirical
Study of Automobile Deficiency Judgment Suits in the District of Columbia, 3 CONN.
L. REV. 511 (1971).
146E.g. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Hitchcock, 116 Ga. App. 563, 158 S.E.2d 468
(1967). Caplovitz describes several cases of deficiency judgments where the creditor had
made bookkeeping errors or there was a misunderstanding or a failure of communication between the debtor and creditor; such categories constituted about 7 per cent of the
cases studied. 1 D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 33, at 7-2.
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seller over the warranty. The buyer's only effective weapon in
such a dispute is to withhold payment. 147 Prior to Fuentes the creditor could retain the upper hand by summary seizure through replevin, and the mere threat of such action was often enough to force the
debtor, who may have needed or very much wanted the continued
use of the goods, to capitulate. Even if such cases were uncommon,
it is unjust to deny a debtor a hearing merely because most debtors
are unsuccessful in court and because we want to avoid the expense
of determining if he is an exception to the usual result. To do justice in individual cases is perhaps expensive but it seems to me to be
the essence of due process.
A second interest said to be furthered by the opportunity for a
prehearing seizure is the protection of the creditor's interest in the
property from concealment, destruction, or even deterioration pending the hearing. This interest is not limited to cases where the creditor doubts the debtor's good faith. For instance, in the case of
automobiles the debtor may have an accident during the pendency
of the hearing. Accidents, however, do not happen very often and
most credit agreements involving automobiles require the debtor to
carry insurance adequate to protect the creditor. With respect to
deterioration, creditors cannot reasonably rely on the security of
consumer goods so ephemeral as to lose significant value during the
short period pending hearing. Except for automobiles, the principle function of security interests in consumer goods is not to provide
assets from which the creditor can look to for payment, but to provide the creditor with a weapon. Repossession and sale of most
consumer goods will generally not realize much for the creditor, but
the mere threat can be an effective inducement for the debtor to
pay. 148 All of which is to say that the creditor's rights in the usual
case should not be affected by the exceptional case. Furthermore,
these creditors' interests can be adequately protected without depriving the debtor of his possession of the goods, as will be discussed
below. 4
A third interest said to be served by prehearing seizure is the
creditors' need for an adequate, practical, and inexpensive remedy,
making possible the continued availability of retail credit. While
there is little empirical evidence on the effect of creditors' remedies
Where a holder in due course intervenes that power is lost.
The point is well made in the recent Crowther Report to the British Parliament
on Consumer Credit, 1 CONSUMER CREDIT COMMITTEE, FIRST REPORT, CMD. No.
4596, at 287 (1971).
149 See note 185 infra & accompanying text.
147
14 8
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upon the availability of consumer credit, it seems reasonable to assume that significant interference with important creditor remedies,
particularly those having to do with security interests will impair
the availability of consumer credit. The preliminary studies conducted by the National Commission on Consumer Finance indicate
that repossession is one of the most valued tools of collection.' 10 For
many consumers, particularly low-income buyers, a purchase money
security interest in the goods is the only kind of security they are
able to grant creditors other than future earning capacity. If unable
to give any effective security, at least the marginal consumers may
well have difficulty buying automobiles, major appliances, and other
much needed and desired goods. Effective creditor remedies are, in
a real sense, in the interests of potential debtor-consumers as well
as creditors. If consumer credit is in the public interest then it would
seem that efficient and effective creditor remedies are in the public
interest.151
The question remains whether in requiring notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to seizure Fuentes has deprived creditors of an effective and efficient remedy. That in turn depends
upon the nature of the required notice and hearing. But before
examining the nature of the hearing, it should be noted that, as
Justice Stewart pointed out, all Fuentes requires is an opportunity
to be heard and then probably only on very short notice. 5 2 Given
the high rate of default judgments in consumer collection cases, it
is unlikely that there will be many actual hearings and most cases
will be decided by default.
IV.

WHAT'S

DUE

THE DEBTOR:

THE NATURE OF THE REQUIRED HEARING

While the opportunity for a hearing of some sort may not generally be dependent upon the nature of the interests involved, so
150 Preliminary reports of the National Commission on Consumer Finance studies

indicate that security interests in personal property are considered the most important
remedy for banks and finance companies in secured transactions. Johnson, Creditors'
Remedies and Rate Ceilings, 26 PERSONAL FINANCE LQ. REp. 64 (1972). A recent,
but limited, study suggests Fuentes will have little effect upon the availability or cost of
consumer credit. Krahmer, Clifford & Lasley, Fuentes v. Shevin: Due Process and the
Consumer, A Legal and Empirical Study, 4 TEXAS TECH. L REV. 23 (1972).
151 The court in Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., was surely unnecessarily glib
in suggesting that there was no governmental or debtor interest in maintaining effective creditor remedies. 315 F. Supp. at 723. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d
1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971) more frankly recognized the public interest in effective
creditor remedies, although it gave such interest little weight. Id. at 278-79, 486 P.2d
at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
152 See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) regarding the length of notice.
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long as those interests are not de minimis, the Supreme Court has on
a number of occasions indicated that "[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent
proceedings. "153
The possible types of preseizure hearings might range from a preemptory review of the papers filed in court by a clerk or an administrative aide to a full dress trial with all the protections afforded a
criminal defendant. Without spelling out in detail the nature of the
required hearing, the Court in Fuentes suggested two elements were
necessary: (1) "evaluation by a neutral official" and (2) an opportunity for the defendant to be heard. 4 There certainly was no indication that the hearing need be elaborate, as was the case in Goldberg v. Kelly, 5' the Supreme Court's most detailed analysis of the
nature of hearings required by due process. Goldberg held that
before welfare benefits can be cut off the recipient must be afforded:
the opportunity to appear personally, with counsel, before an independent decision-maker; the right to confront and cross examine the
witnesses relied on by the state; the right to present evidence; and
the right to require the decision-maker to state the reasons for his
decision and the evidence relied upon.
It might in some instances seem difficult to distinguish the importance of the interests of the defendant in a replevin case where
the property seized is truly a necessity from the case of the welfare
recipients' welfare benefits. However, as the Court in Goldberg
emphasized, nearly all welfare recipients who are legally entitled to
benefits will be put in a condition of "overpowering need" if their
benefits are cut off.'5 6 A welfare recipient is by definition living on
a thin margin and he has no alternative means of holding on long
enough for a hearing. On the other hand, in a significant number
of replevins the defendant will have alternative means of surviving
pending final determination of the merits of the suit.1 57 If the nature of the hearing is to be the same in all replevin cases, the distinction is perhaps justified.
Other contemporary Supreme Court cases say little as to the na153 Boddie v. Conn. 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
See also Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
154 This would rule out the ex parte hearing approved of in Wheeler v. Adams Co.,
322 F. Supp. 645 (D. Md. 1971).
155 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
156 Id. at 261.
157 Wage garnishments probably lie somewhere between replevin and welfare cutoffs, but, there also, not all wage garnishments produce desperation.
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ture of the hearing. In most cases, such as Bell v. Burson, the Court
thought it sufficient to assert the necessity for a hearing and to add
some general language indicating that it must be fair and appropriate158 or, as Justice Stewart put it in Fuentes, "the hearing must provide a real test."' 59 This analysis leaves little guidance as to what
kind of hearing must be provided in replevin actions. The issue is
of great importance because after Fuentes virtually every state will
be forced to amend their laws and procedures for replevin.' 60 However, as I shall argue, in at least those jurisdictions having modern
procedural systems modeled after the Federal Rules, alternatives under existing law are available.
Justice Stewart's bald statement in Fuentes that the hearing must
provide a "real test" leaves unanswered the obvious question what
the hearing should be a true test of. The opinion in Fuentes simply
quotes from Harlan in Sniadach that the hearing is for "establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying
claim against the alleged debtor... ."161 In Bell v. Burson the Court
stated that the hearing requirement provides "a forum for the determination of the question whether there is a reasonable possibility
of a judgment being rendered against him."' 62 In contrast, Goldberg required a hearing "to produce an initial determination of the
validity of the welfare department's grounds for discontinuance of
payments... ."" This would seem to indicate that the Goldberg
hearing must determine more than just the reasonable possibility
that the claimant is not entitled to continuation of welfare benefits,
and there is nothing in Goldberg or the HEW regulations issued
in response to Goldberg to suggest otherwise.' 4 Here again, Gold158 402

U.S. at 542.
159 407 U.S. at 97.
160 Justice Stewart's opinion purposely left open all questions concerning the type
of hearing required saying that it was a "subject, at this point, for legislation - not
adjudication." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972) (footnote omitted). The
New York statute enacted prior to Fuentes and in response to Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970), seems hardly an adequate answer.
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAWS § 7102(d) (McKinney Supp. 1972-73):
(1) Upon presentation of the affidavit and undertaking and upon terms
as may be required to conform to the due process of law requirements of the
fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, the court shall
grant an order directing the sheriff of any county where the chattel is found
to seize the chattel....
161 395 U.S. at 343.
162 402 U.S. at 542.
163 397 U.S. at 267.
16445 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1971).
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berg is probably distinguishable on the basis of the overriding need
of all legitimate welfare recipients for continued benefits.
To summarize, the hearing which Fuentes requires prior to seizure in a replevin action must have the following features in order
to satisfy the minimum requirements of due process: (1) the hearing must be before an independent decision-maker, who need not be
a judge or even an officer of the court,' (2) the controlling issue
is to be whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed at a trial on the
merits, and (3) on this issue the defendant must have the opportunity to be heard.
There exists in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in some
states a procedure which satisfies both the minimum requirements
of due process and the needs of creditors. Under federal rule 65 a
temporary restraining order (TRO) may be granted ex parte and
without notice, but only if the affidavits or verified complaint show
that irreparable injury will occur unless the motion is granted ex
parte and the attorney certifies that he has attempted to notify the
other side or indicates the reason for not so notifying them. The
TRO itself must state reasons for its being issued without notice.
A TRO cannot, unless extended, last more than 10 days and the defendant can get a hearing within two days if he requests it. The
next step is a speedy hearing, with notice to the other side, on the
preliminary injunction which, if granted, can remain in force until
the trial on the merits.
The traditional criteria for granting either a preliminary injunction or a TRO are the probability of the plaintiff's success on the
merits, the irreparability of harm to the plaintiff pending a final
hearing on the merits, the likelihood that the damage to the plaintiff
if the injunction is denied outweighs the foreseeable harm to the
defendant caused by the grant of preliminary relief, and, in the case
of a TRO without notice, the extent to which immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result before the other side can be
heard.'6 6 All these criteria are, of course, subject to the traditional
discretionary powers of equity courts to deny injunctive relief in appropriate cases. 167 The ultimate merits are not decided unless the
165 Cf. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1971).
Indeed this and many
other aspects of the debtor-creditor relationship might be handled best through a separate quasi-judicial administrative agency.
166 Developments in the Law - Injunctions, 78 HARV. L REv. 994, 1056 (1965).
16 7

H: McCLiNTocK, EQUITY § 23 (1948).'
De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945). However, there have
been cases of what might be called equitable replevin under FED. R. Civ. P. 65, usually
involving seizure of allegedly obscene material. E.g. Vali Books Inc. v. Murphy, 343
F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). If the credit agreement requires the debtor to turn
over the collateral upon default, a court could perhaps order specific performance of
this promise under rule 65.
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hearing on the motion for provisional relief is consolidated with the
trial on the merits, which the rules explicitly permit.
If, as I will attempt to show, the procedures for provisional
equitable remedies are appropriately applied to replevin, it should
be simple enough for a state legislature to either model a new replevin law after federal rule 65 or else include replevin among the
remedies available under rule 65. In those states where the courts
have adequate rule-making power this may be possible without legis6
lation.6'
There is, however, one respect in which rule 65 practice is probably not an appropriate model for replevin. As indicated, the
court's decision to issue a TRO or preliminary injunction turns in
part on a determination that the applicant will suffer irreparable injury if the provisional remedy is denied, and on a balancing of that
injury with the harm which might foreseeably occur to the other
side if the provisional relief is granted. The object of provisional
relief is to maintain the status quo until a full hearing on the merits
can be held. In the traditional replevin action no such determination and balancing could occur because the writ was issued and the
property seized without notice, hearing, or scrutiny by an official.
If it is correct to conclude that the plaintiff in replevin need only
establish a reasonable probability of success in the trial on the merits,
no such determination of irreparable injury or balancing of the in69
juries in individual cases is necessary.1
It is as though there were a rule-of-thumb judgment that in replevin cases as a class the balance of the equities requires the availability of provisional relief in the form of seizure prior to a full trial
on the merits, subject, however, to a constitutional requirement of
due process for one element of the usual test for provisional relief:
that the plaintiff be reasonably likely to succeed at the trial on the
merits.
It could, and no doubt will, be argued that due process requires
the opportunity to be heard on the issue of irreparable injury and the
balancing of the injuries. This argument should not succeed.
There is no basis, given the current state of constitutional doctrine,
Rule 64, relying on existing state law, is not of any help and neither is rule 70
which deals only with final judgments. 7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 70102

(2 ed. 1948).
168 Rule 65 probably could not be used directly because replevin is a legal remedy.
169 There are other requirements sometimes invoked in denying provisional equitable relief that should not apply to replevin. For example, it should not be necessary to
demonstrate that the plaintiffs injuries would be irreparable if the provisional relief
were not granted; nor should there be a requirement that provisional relief not grant
the plaintiff the full measure of relief he would have received with a permanent injunction. See Developments, supra note 166, at 1056-69.
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for finding the traditional standards for issuing provisional equitable relief constitutionally required.170 If this be true, there is no
reason why Congress or a state legislature could not authorize provisional relief upon a mere showing by the plaintiff that he is more
likely than not to succeed. If provisional relief can constitutionally
be granted on the basis of probability of success in all cases, there is
no reason why this cannot be done in a limited class of cases, such
as replevin actions.'
It is relevant at this point to suggest some possible explanations
why replevin, one of the most ancient of the common law provisional remedies,' 7 2 was historically available without the now-customary showing of irreparable injury and a balancing of the comparative injuries. The most obvious historical reason is that replevin
was an action in law and injunctions were in equity. Courts of law
did not consider themselves enpowered to make such a vague determination or to balance equities.
A second historical reason derives from the origin of replevin.
Replevin was originally designed to remedy wrongful distraint by
landlords and was for a time limited to such cases. 173 The action
170 There is little law on the potential due process objections to provisional equitable
relief. Holcomb v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 228 F.2d 75, 82 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 986 (1955). But see Buchman v. Smith, 136 N.J. Eq. 246, 248, 41 A.2d
262, 264, afl'd, 137 N.J. Eq. 215, 44 A.2d 179 (1945). See also Carroll v. Commissioner, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). The courts have stressed the importance of caution in
granting ex parte restraining orders. See Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 357 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1966); Carpenters' Dist. Council
v. Cicci, 261 F.2d 5 (6th Cit. 1958); Sims v. Greene, 161 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1947);
and comments accompanying 1966 revision of FED. R. CIv. P. 65, 39 F.R.D. 69, 12425 (1966).
171 As a matter of policy, as opposed to constitutional law, one might argue for a
balancing of the hardships test for both the provisional and final replevin remedies.
Giving the court discretion to deny replevin would enable the court to force the parties
to work out an arrangement which might save the transaction. This is done in several
Canadian provinces with no apparent ill effects upon the availability of consumer credit.
Ziegel, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Canadian Consumer Oriented Viewpoint, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 488, 504-07 (1968).
172 Replevin can be traced as far back as the end of the 12th or the beginning of
the 13th century. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 248 (3d ed.
1922). Antiquity provides, of course, no immunity from constitutional challenge.
"The fact that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal regime does not mean it
gives necessary protection to property in its modern forms." Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1968). On the other hand, as Justice Holmes said,
"[ilf a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will need
a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it .... " Jackman v. Rosenbaum
Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
73
1
J. COBBEY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REPLEVIN AS ADMINISTERED BY THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES § 53 (2d ed. 1900); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 249 (3d ed. 1922). Distraint is a self-help
remedy whereby the landlord seizes the tenant's chattels and holds them as ransom
until the tenant pays his due. The landlord at early common law had no right to sell
the goods. Id. at 248; T. PLUNCKETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
383 (5th ed. 1956).
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was a legal remedy for a wrongful taking where the landlord made
no claim of ownership to the property but only claimed a primitive
sort of lien. As Justice Stewart was careful to point out in Fuentes,
at common law a replevin action did not authorize a sheriff to summarily seize property where the defendant asserted a claim of ownership in the property. Once the defendant asserted ownership the
plaintiff was forced to resort to a writ of de proprietateprobanda, a
remedy which developed in response to the practice of defendants
using the claim of ownership merely as a delaying tactic.' 4 This
writ required the sheriff to determine summarily the question of
ownership, presumably after some sort of hearing, although the
authorities are not clear on the nature of the procedure.1 7 5 This
resulted in merely a preliminary determination, as the defendant
retained the right to defend in the replevin action.' 7 6 Replevin was
an effort to restore the status quo pending a determination of the
landlord's right of distraint. Since the landlord in a replevin action
was ultimately deprived only of his self-help weapon of withholding the tenant's property, which he could not use or sell, the return of the property to the tenant did not deprive the landlord of
77
any "property," only of his weapon.
By the time the Constitution was adopted, however, replevin had
significantly changed in at least some of the states so that the defendant in a replevin action could retain possession only by giving
a counterbond, much as is true today. Indeed, Pennsylvania, one
of the states whose replevin law was before the Court in Fuentes,
as early as 1705 required a counterbond from the defendant in order for him to retain possession of the property subject to the replevin action.178 Therefore, in at least some states at the time the
Constitution and the fourteenth amendment were adopted, replevin
procedure existed in substantially the same form, though not in the
same scope, as is typical today. 9
Over a period of time replevin became available for other alleged wrongful "takings" but it was not until quite recently in the
1743

W.

HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 249 (3d ed. 1922).

175 Ames referred to it as an "inquest of office." Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels,
3 HARv. L. REV. 23, 32 (1889). See also P. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 26.
176p. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 26.
177
This functional analysis was supported by the fiction that the chattels distrained
were "in the custody of the law, and not merely in that of the distrainer." 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 146 (1st ed. reprint 1966).
178 p. MORRIS, supra note 15, at 32.
179 Seizure without notice or opportunity for a hearing predates the Constitution
and thus history does not, as Justice Stewart seemed to suggest, support the Fuentes
result.
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long history of replevin that the action became generally available
for wrongful retention as opposed to wrongful taking. 80 Detinue
was the historical remedy for wrongful detention, and seizure prior
to trial was not available in such an action. Thus, in the distinction
between detinue and replevin, and particularly when replevin was
limited chiefly to a remedy for wrongful distraint, a rough but generally sound balancing of equities with regard to provisional relief
had been struck. Only when the plaintiff was able to allege a recent
wrongful taking, upsetting the status quo, were provisional reme181
dies available to restore that status quo.
In the judicial repossession of property subject to a security interest, the most common use of replevin today, the plaintiff seeks
the possession of property wrongfully detained by the debtor but in
which the debtor initially had rightful possession.
This use of replevin suggests a different set of equities and possibily a different judgment as to the availability of provisional remedies. There are, however, two factors that justify the continued
use of replevin as a provisional remedy once the defendant has an
opportunity to be heard on the creditor's probable right to possession. First, the plaintiff has, or must show that he probably has,
a "property" interest in the goods in the form of a security interest.
Second, the creditor's need to quickly and economically realize the
value of his security interest justifies a provisional remedy once the
creditor has shown a likelihood of success at a trial on the merits.
Given the shameful delays of trial common today in every major metropolitan area, security interests in consumer goods would be nearly
worthless if there were no provisional remedy. Even the most durable consumer good would likely lose most of its value in the two
or three years the creditor would have to wait today for a full trial.
As has been previously argued, it is in the interest of debtors as a
class, as well as creditors and society in general, to maintain effective security devices.
As I indicated earlier, rule 65 is an appropriate model and is the
basis of my primary suggestion to those revising their replevin procedures. One important reason for this is that the federal courts
18 0 R.

SHINN, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF REPLEVIN AND KINDRED

ACTIONS FOR GETTING POSSESSION OF CHATrELS § 23-24 (1809); P. MORRIS, supra

note 15, at 37-45.
181 The same principle is found in modern provisional equitable remedies, see Developments in the Law - Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1058 (1965), where
status quo is defined as the "last actual peaceable non-contested status . . . which preceded the pending suit," quoting Cornett v. Reynolds, 289 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1956).
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and many state courts have operated under such procedures for
many years, have found them workable, and would find them familiar if applied to replevin actions. Conceptually replevin is like a
temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction insofar as
they all are provisional specific remedies. The principal difference
between replevin, a legal remedy, and an injunction, an equitable
remedy, is that the injunction runs to the defendants named in the
decree or order. In replevin, enforcement is effected through a
sheriff and not by contempt.
Something like the two-tier approach of federal rule 65 is desirable in a post Fuentes scheme of remedies. While in most cases
notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to seizure is constitutionally required, both the Sniadach and Fuentes Courts recognized
that in extraordinary circumstances it may be desirable and constitutional for seizure of the property to take place without notice and
an opportunity for a hearing. It is true that Justice Stewart in
Fuentes appeared initially to limit those extraordinary situations to
cases where there is an important governmental or general public
interest involved, pointing out that the Pennsylvania and Florida
replevin statutes "allow summary seizure of a person's possessions
when no more than private gain is directly at stake. ' 182 But he recognized that "there may be cases in which a creditor could make a
showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal
disputed goods. ' 183 A revamped state replevin statute should make
provision for such cases. This could be done, as in federal rule 65,
by requiring the creditor's attorney to certify to the court why notice should not be required and for the court's order to state why no
notice was required. There is a danger, of course, that the attorney's certification will become a hollow formality. Because of the
volume of cases it is unlikely that the certification will be given the
close scrutiny that is the general practice under rule 65. Whether
the danger is realized will depend on the diligence and capacity of
the courts.'
The temporary order granted in extraordinary situations with182

407 U.S. at 92.

183 Id. at 93.
184 Cedar Rapids Engineering Co. v. Haenelt, 68 Misc. 2d 206, 326 N.Y.S.2d 653
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1971) (decided under a statute designed to satisfy the due process holding of Laprease, see note 160 supra), is a hopeful sign. "The mere filing of perfunc
tory allegations by the creditor that the debtor was about to abscond with or fraudulently
convey the property and that there was a valid debt are not constitutionally sufficient
to justify the temporary deprivation of the use of special property." Id. at 210, 326
N.Y.S.2d at 658.
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out notice should be of short duration, perhaps only ten days as
under rule 65, and the plaintiff should post an appropriate bond.
The defendant, upon short notice, thereafter could recover the property if he moves successfully for its return. During this 10-day
period the sheriff would retain the goods until after the hearing or,
in case of default, until after the time set for a hearing has passed.
This would be analogous to the holding period provided for by most
replevin statutes during which time the defendant may post a counterbond. The counterbond option, incidently, need not be abolished
by this suggested reform.
As a matter of course, the notice of the hearing required by
Fuentes can contain an order from the court directing that the defendant not remove, conceal, damage or dispose of the property subject to a security interest. Such an order would not interfere with
the defendant's normal use of the property and would ordinarily
maintain the status quo until the time of the hearing required by
Fuentes. If the defendant's use of the property is not significantly
interferred with by the temporary restraining order, he can have no
due process objections to the order having been issued prior to an
opportunity for a hearing. 8"
This order restraining the defendant from changing the status
quo would, in most cases, merely spell out the debtor's duties under
the retail installment contract. However, a damage remedy against
a defaulting debtor is not much protection since a defaulting debtor
is almost by definition a collection problem. On the other hand, the
threat of enforcement through a contempt of court order, carrying
the possibility of a jail sentence, is more likely to be effective.
At the hearing the plaintiff will be required to show only that
he would likely succeed at a full trial on the merits. If the defendant is able to raise substantial doubts regarding this, he should be
permitted to retain the goods. This suggested scheme bears some
similarity to that provided for by the NCA. The NCA, however,
significantly modifies the effect of acceleration clauses and the debtor's right to redeem - issues that are beyond the scope of this article and which are too closely geared to the repossession provisions
to be separately evaluated.
185 Accord, Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn. 1971)
holding prejudgment attachment of real estate not unconstitutional because, inter alia,
it does not deprive the defendant of the use and enjoyment of the land pending hearing.
But see Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1356 (D. Del. 1971). See also Magro
v. Lentini Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. N.Y. 1971); Santiago
v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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In case of failure to prosecute or default by the plaintiff, the
property will be retained by the defendant or returned to him if
the first tier remedy has been granted. In case of default by the defendant with respect to the hearing on the provisional remedies,
the plaintiff's allegations in his verified complaint will be taken as
true and the plaintiff should be given possession of the property subject to the qualification discussed below. If the defendant fails to
appear at the appointed hearing but has filed a written plea denying
the allegations of the complaint or raising an affirmative defense,
the question arises whether the creditor or his attorney must appear
at the hearing in order for the court to be able to issue an order for
the immediate seizure of the property pending trial.
An efficient procedural system should avoid requiring the attorney for the plaintiff to appear in court in order to obtain a seizure
order by default. Even for the attorney processing such cases on a
mass basis, as most collection attorneys do, the considerable expense of requiring the attorney's presence should not be required
unless substantial benefit is realized.
'While there is some authority that the courts can grant a preliminary injunction on default,'8 6 in practice courts generally will
not grant a preliminary injunction, even with notice, without requiring the plaintiff to appear and demonstrate by evidence or affidavit that he has grounds for such relief. The preliminary injunction, however, often will raise more serious problems than the
stereotypic replevin action. Whereas with replevin the only remedy sought is the transfer of possession of specified property, the
remedies sought and available in a proceeding for a preliminary injunction could involve many very significant matters, some of which
might affect interests beyond those of the particular defendant. 8 '
Therefore there might be good reason for requiring the plaintiff
seeking a preliminary injunction to appear in court and make some
kind of showing even when the defendant has defaulted.
An ideal replevin system would permit the court to decide the
issue of the plaintiff's reasonable probability of success either on
the basis of affidavits or verified pleadings, if any, much as in the
18 6 Estee Lauder, Inc. v. Satsky, 323 F. Supp. 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); 7 J. MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACrIcE § 65.03 (3) (2d ed. 1972). In Estee Lauder, however, only some
of the defendants had defaulted and there had been an evidentiary hearing for the other
defendants.
187 E.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970),
309 N.Y.S.2d 312. This analysis could help explain the result in two of the cases distinguished by Mr. Justice Douglas in Sniadach: McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820
(1928); and Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
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case of a motion for summary judgment in federal practice.'
Where the defendant has by pleadings, motions, or appearance at
the hearing raised a substantial question, a determination must be
made by the court. In the case of complete default by the defendant, the order directing the sheriff to seize the goods should be
made only after a clerk of court has examined the complaint and
any papers filed by the plaintiff and has determined that, on their
face, the papers show the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the
property and that no defense exists.' 89 The reason for this last limitation on the usual rules of default is that a large percentage of
consumer credit collection suits end by default. There is evidence
that in a significant number of these cases the defendant has a defense but is merely ignorant of his rights, is unable to obtain counsel, is unaware of the availability of legal aid, is put off by the majesty of the courts, or is lazy and does not take the appropriate steps
to defend. 190
While it is clear that our whole system of justice is founded
upon the premise that the court is passive and the parties must protect their own rights, this premise is frequently qualified in practice.' 9 ' At least some courts give the pleadings superficial scrutiny
before entering default judgments, if only to determine the appropriate amount of the judgment. 02 Furthermore, in the typical consumer credit case many of the usual assumptions concerning the
operation of the judicial system are just not true. First of all the
cost of defending a repossession case for the typical consumer is
much greater than the cost of prosecution for the typical creditor. 9 3
Collection attorney's, unlike those of debtors, generally are able to
operate on an assembly line basis. And while the massive expansion of legal aid to the indigent has significantly changed the balance of power for some groups, it still is impractical for the middle
class consumer to defend a repossession case. The amount involved
would seldom justify the fee for an attorney's time. However, the
additional cost and burden on the court of having a competent clerk
188 The experience under FED. R. CIV. P. 65 is relevant here. See, e.g., Detroit &
Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 357 F.2d 152 (6th
Cir. 1966); Carpenters' Dist. Council v. Cicci, 261 F.2d 5 (6th Cir. 1958); Sims v.
Green, 161 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1947).
189 For instance a retail installment contract may show on its face violation of the
state usury laws, a complete defense in some states.
19
0 See generally, 1 D. CAPLOVITZ, supra rote 33, ch. 4.
19'F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.2 (1965).
192 The Los Angeles practice is described in Note, supra note 33, at 888-92.
93

1

Leff, supra note 112, at 19-24.
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thoroughly review all documents in default cases would be small
compared with the encouragement of honesty and care that such a
system would produce, although it should be stressed that this last
suggestion is not required by due process as presently understood
and is independent of the basic proposed replevin scheme.
Indeed, it should also be understood that the proposed scheme
probably goes beyond the minimum due process requirements in a
number of respects. A considerably simpler system may well meet
the minimum requirements of Fuentes. For instance, if there is
sufficient advance notice that the creditor intends to bring an action
of replevin, the debtor has a chance to hire an attorney and bring
his own action to enjoin the anticipated replevin. Informal notice
by the creditor that the debtor's property will be repossessed should
not, however, be deemed sufficient notice given the common collection practice of making numerous false threats. More formal advance notice may satisfy the constitutional requirement of notice
and opportunity for a hearing if the state procedures permit an
injunction of a replevin action' and if the fact that the replevin
defendant took the initiative to determine the right of replevin does
not alter the burden of proof. 195 These last requirements may well
require a change in the law of procedure and equity in some states.
A second alternative would be to require the replevin plaintiff
to serve the defendant with a copy of the complaint along with a
notice that a writ of replevin ordering the sheriff to seize the named
property would issue unless the replevin defendant appeared within
a certain period of time and showed cause why such writ should not
issue. The same reservations about a shift in the burden of proof
under state proceedure would apply here but the difficulty of proving meaningful notice is resolved by the formality of the complaint
and notice showing that a law suit had been or was about to be initiated.
With both of these alternatives, and particularly the first, an objection may be raised that the procedure leaves too much to the initiative of the debtor, often too poor or too ignorant of the law to
know how to respond. I find less difficulty with the second alternative in this respect since it raises no more problems for the debtor
194 Cf. Magro v. Lenrtini Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 338 F. Supp 464 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.C. 1970). Advance notice is not
enough unless there are procedures for a preseizure hearing. McCallop v. Carberry, 1
Cal. 3d 903, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666, 464 P.2d 122 (1970).
195 See Armstrong v. Lanzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp.

1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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than the primary suggestion outlined earlier or, indeed, than any
legal proceeding. The first alternative, however, is subject to some
of the same objections as the counterbond, which, of course, could
be made available prior to seizure without eliminating the due process problem. While it is entirely possible for an individual debtor
to appear pro se at a hearing on the provisional seizure, no unassisted layman could be expected to be able to bring a suit to enjoin
a contemplated replevin action. Even when an attorney is involved
it would be necessary to prepare the papers to start such a suit, to
serve the creditor, and then to appear before a court for a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction, all within the few
days that would probably be available. And this assumes that the
amount of money involved would justify retaining an attorney, who
might reasonably expect a retainer for this task, involving considerably more time and expense than a simple appearance at the replevin hearing that my primary suggestion comtemplates. 19' 6 The filing fees and the practical likelihood of a retainer may subject the
first alternative scheme to the same due process and equal protection
arguments mentioned earlier with regard to the counterbond.
V.

DUE PROCESS AND SELF-HELP REPOSSESSION

A.

The Nature of Self-Help Repossession
The typical consumer credit security agreement provides that
the creditor may repossess the debtor's property by physical removal
without the aid of judicial process. Even if the agreement is silent
the UCC gives the creditor that right if he can do it "without breach
of peace." One might ask why all the talk of replevin hearings if
creditors can avoid the impact of Fuentes by merely bypassing the
legal processes and repossessing privately. If this were possible
then perhaps Fuentes would be, as the dissent put it, mere "ideological tinkering." There are two answers to that suggestion: first,
self-help repossession is often not legally or practically possible
and, in any event, is subject to considerable hazard; second, selfhelp repossession itself may be subject to due process limitations.
Automobiles are often relatively easy objects of private repossession. If the automobile is left on a street or parking lot, all the
repossessor need do is exercise the skills of an ordinary car thief
and drive the automobile away. This is more difficult with other
196 One common problem faced is determining the appropriate legal name of a
merchant or creditor who operates under a trade name different from his legal name.
The creditor's legal name is obtainable but often not without time, trouble and expense.
See Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for
Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 420 (1966).
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consumer goods such as furniture and appliances which require the
repossessor to enter the debtor's residence. To gain entrance to the
debtor's home may require threats, fraudulent misrepresentations,
or trickery, and these tactics often create a risk of violence or lesser
breaches of the peace. The men hired to repossess consumer goods,
sometimes called "repo goons," are usually menacing in appearance
and manner. Their tactics are often forceful and crude, and the
debtor is usually traumatized by the whole process. "In the underworld of consumer finance, . . . repossession is a knockdown,
drag-out battle waged on both sides with cunning guile and a com' 7
plete disregard for the rules of fair play.' 1
The law varies from state to state as to what constitutes a "breach
of the peace," and even within any one jurisdiction the standards
are likely to be fuzzy.' " ' Even a sophisticated creditor can seldom
be certain that he has not gone too far. Furthermore, the case law
in some states makes it difficult to legally repossess goods from an
occupied home unless the debtor lays out the welcome mat.'99 Although the law has probably not gone far enough to protect debtors from the tough tactics of the repo goons, the legality of many
private repossessions is at least questionable. This may be one reason why replevin is resorted to so often even though it usually is
the more expensive remedy. The expense, however, is not such an
important factor where the debtor has funds. Although repossession requires an initial cash outlay by the creditor, consumer installment contracts nearly always contain a clause requiring the
debtor to pay the creditor's costs of repossession and collection of
the inevitable deficiency judgment.
The legal consequence to the creditor of having a court find his
repossession tactics illegal is not altogether clear. Most cases hold
the creditor liable for conversion of the goods, for trespass if such
has occurred, and for any consequential damages. 0 0 Some courts
have even allowed punitive damages, in some cases substantial, 01
197 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 44.1, at 1212
(1965).
198 The cases are collected in White, Representing the Low-Income Consumer in
Repossessions, Resales and Deficincy Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U.L REV. 808, 810-12
(1970); 3 U.C.C.L.J. 199, 201-03 (1970). See also Note, Non-Judicial Repossession
Reprisal in Need of Reform, 11 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 435 (1970).
199 See, e.g., Girard v. Andercon, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934); Kirkwood
v. Hickman, 223 Miss. 312, 78 So. 2d 351 (1955).
200 See, e.g., Manhattan Credit Co. v. Brewer, 232 Ark., 976, 341 S.W.2d 765
(1961).
201 E.g., Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Wiener, 405 P.2d 691 (Okla. 1965)
(72-year-old
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increasing the risk to the creditor who decides to rely upon his selfhelp remedies. The clause common to consumer credit agreements
purporting to give the creditor the right to enter the debtor's premises to recover the goods is generally not effective in protecting the
creditor, either by reason of statute °2 or case law.203 Repossession
is safer in the case of automobiles but even then there is danger that
the creditor's agent will be found to have acted wrongfully. 0 4 In
any event, self-help repossession is not an adequate substitute for
replevin from any point of view.20 5
B.

The ConstitutionalStatus of Self-Help Repossession

1. The State of the Law.- Even if the creditor can repossess
without a breach of the peace, there is considerable question
whether after Fuentes this common creditor remedy is constitutional.
The issue of whether fourteenth amendment due process standards
will be applied to self-help repossession has been directly raised in
four reported and a number of unreported cases with varying results. 20 6 The question is of great importance and will probably
have to be resolved ultimately by the Supreme Court.20 7
As noted earlier, the UCC gives the secured creditor the right to
repossess without judicial process even if the contract is silent on
the issue. Nevertheless, virtually all consumer credit contracts inwidow recovered $2000 for actual and $1500 for exemplary damages incurred in repossession following default on a $183 balance of the $300 obligation); Kirkwood v.
Hickman, 223 Miss. 372, 78 So. 2d 351 (1955).
202 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. title 6, § 4311 (1970).
203 See, e.g., Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934); Douglas
v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 445 P.2d 590 (Ore. 1968).
204 See, e.g., Morris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 254 N.E.2d
683 (1970); Manhattan Credit Co. v. Brewer, 232 Ark. 976, 341 S.W.2d 765 (1961).
205 See generally Note, supra note 198, at 435 (1970).
2 06
0ller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Adams v. Egley,
334 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Green v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank of Va., CCH
SECURED TRANs. GuiDE 5 51,930 (W.D. Va. 1972); McCormick v. First Nat'l Bank
of Miami, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
207 As important as the issue of state action clearly is, it is surprising that it was not
discussed in two recent case notes discussing Adams v. Egley, 334 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.
Cal. 1972): 5 CREIGHTON L. REV. 360 1972); 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 1503
(1972). State action was also curiously not mentioned in several post-Sniadach cases
which would, based on the analysis presented here, present the issue. See, e.g., Young
v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1970) involving a private real estate foreclosure
sale; But cf. Logan v. Short, 342 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Mo. 1972). See also Stillwater,
The California Bankers Lien Law: A Reappraisal of a Creditors' Remedy in a New Economic Context, 27 Bus. LAW. 777 (1972). Other cases have apparently confused state
action and "under color of law" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See, e.g., Collins v.
Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
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volving a security interest contain specific authorization for such
self-help repossession either by incorporating the UCC remedies by
reference or by an express statement that the creditor can repossess
upon default. No notice is required under either the UCC or under the terms of the usual consumer credit contract."" 8 Upon deciding that the debtor is in default, the creditor simply hires a repo
goon to seize the property and the first notice that the debtor receives, other than the disappearance of his property, is that the creditor plans to dispose of the collateral at private or public sale. In
practice then, the self-help repossession procedure results in the
deprivation of the debtor's property without notice or opportunity
for a hearing every bit as much as does the replevin procedure
found unconstitutional in Fuentes. The chief differences are first
that the debtor has in some states, at least in theory, the right to resist the seizure and therefore to force the creditor to resort to legal
process,2 9 and second, that private repossession is not carried out by
a publicly appointed and controlled official. Of course, when the
property is seized while the debtor is absent the first difference is irrelevant and the second suggests the debtor would prefer replevin. 210 Nevertheless as a constitutional matter, self-help repossession and replevin are distinguishable on the basis of the involvement of the state. Regardless of how oppressive and unfair
self-help repossession might be, unless there is state action there can
be no violation of the debtor's constitutional rights under the fourteenth amendment.2 1'
The first case to face the issue, McCormick v,First National
Bank of Miami,212 found no state action since the repossession was
pursuant to contract and not pursuant to state law. The fact that
the contract merely stated the creditor might exercise his rights under the UCC was said to be of no consequence. "Reference to the
Uniform Commercial Code is simply a matter of incorporating by
reference . . . provisions which could have been set forth word for
20

SPreseizure notice under some state retail installment sales statutes will, however,
limit the debtor's right to redeem. E.g., MAss GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 2550 §§ 21, 22
(Supp. 1972).
209 See, e.g., Morris v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 254
N.E.2d 683 (1970); Stone Machinery Co. v. Kessler, 1 Wash. App. 750, 463 P.2d
651 (1970).
210 Comment, Non-Judicial Repossession - Reprisal in Need of Reform, 11 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 435 (1970).
211 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) is generally cited for this fundamental
principle.
212 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24: 7

word in the contract signed by the plaintiffs."2 1 This was only
one of three alternative holdings of the decision denying the debtor
relief; the other two holdings have been clearly overruled by later
Supreme Court cases. 214 In spite of this rather poor batting average, there is no sign that the McCormick court was wrong on the
state action issue.
In Adams v. Egley2t 5 the contracts made less explicit reference to
the UCC, yet the court had no difficulty in finding state action,
and once having done that, in finding a violation of due process.
The Adams court relied almost entirely on Reitman v. Mulkey 216
in which the Supreme Court held that proposition 14, a newlyadopted provision in the California constitution prohibiting state
restrictions on an individual's right to discriminate in the sale of
residential real estate, violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The effect of proposition 14 was to void
various state and local anti-discrimination laws and to make it difficult or impossible to enact new anti-discriminatory laws. The
Adams court thought Reitman analogous to self-help repossession
since in both cases the state is encouraging as well as authorizing
private actions which the state could not itself constitutionally undertake. The Adams court reasoned that "the presence of Sections
[9-503 and 9-504 of the UCC] had a significant impact on the
contents of that contract's provisions" and that the contractual crossreferences to the Code showed that "in drawing up the agreements
defendant creditors were 'persuaded or induced to include' repossession by the fact that such repossession was permitted by statute."21'
These Code sections "set forth a state policy, and the security agreements upon which the instant actions rest, whose terms
are authorized by the statute and which incorporate its provisions,
are merely an embodiment of that policy," 218 and therefore constitute state action.
The third case, Oller v. Bank of America219 rejected the Adams
213
2

Id. at 606.

4

The holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970) does not confer jurisdiction
where only "property rights" are involved was overruled in Lynch v. Household Fin.
Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
A second alternative holding adopted the reasoning in
1

Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), which of course was overruled by the Supreme Court in Fuentes v. Shevin, 470 U.S. 67 (1972).
215
216

338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
387 U.S. 369 (1967).

217 338 F. Supp. at 617.
218Id at 618.
219 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).

1972]

REPOSSESSION OF CONSUMER GOODS

holding and suggested a fundamental problem with the Adams -rationale:
It is difficult to imagine any statutory provision that does not,
in some way, control human relationships. To say, as plaintiff
seems to contend, that all human behavior which conforms to statutory requirements is "State action" or is "under color of State
law" would far exceed not only what the framers220of the Civil
Rights Act ever intended but common sense as well.
The fourth case, Greene v. First National Exchange Bank of
Virginia,221 reached the same result as McCormick and Oller, without citing either. The court based its decision on language in
Fuentes referring to governmental action and on the lack of "active
222
and direct state action" in self-help repossession.
The Adams resolution of the state action issue finds some support in several other cases applying Sniadach principles, although
not always on the same rationale. For instance, in Magro v. Lentini
Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 2 23 a Sniadach-based attack upon UCC
section 7-210 which grants a warehousemen's lien and provides for
the nonjudicial sale of property subject to the lien was rejected.
Before reaching the due process argument however, the Court indicated, without so holding, that if necessary it would have found
state action on the theory that the warehouseman's execution on his
own lien constituted a private person performing a traditionally
public function.22" 4 In Klim v. Jones225 the California Innkeeper's
Lien Law was held unconstitutional on the basis of Sniadach and its
progeny. California's innkeeper's lien was completely statutory although there were direct common law antecedents, and there was
no form contract distinguishing the case from Adams. The Klim
court found state action, relying principally on racial discrimination
cases such as Reitman, Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.2 26 and the oftenquoted statement from United States v. Classic227 that "misuse of
220 Id. at 23. Adams v. Egley and Oller v. Bank of America are reviewed and
quoted at some length by Burke, Conflicting Views on Self Help Provisions of Uniform
Commercial Code Expressed by Federal District Courts in California, 26 PERSONAL
FINANcE L Q. REP. 33 (1972).
221
CCH SECURED TRANs. GUIDE 5 51, 930 (W.D. Va. 1972).
2-2 Id.
223338 F. Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
224 Id. at 466. Citing, among other cases, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946);
and Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
225315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
226398 U.S. 144 (1970).
227313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
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power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of state law.' "
Adickes involved a suit, under Section 1983 of title 42 of the
United States Code, 228 against a store which had refused to serve the
plaintiff, a white woman, because she was accompanied by blacks.
The state action in that case was found, at least in part, in the fact
that the police by arresting the plaintiff for vagrancy were assisting
the store owner in his discriminatory policies, a situation not comparable to self-help repossession. 229 However, Justice Brennan's
opinion in Adickes, concurring in part and dissenting in part, contained some very broad language, quoted in Klim, which might arguably cover self-help repossession:
Thus, when private action conforms with state policy, it be-

comes a manifestation of that policy and is thereby drawn within
the ambit of state action .... A private person acts "under color
of" a state statute or other law when he, like the official, in some
ways acts consciously pursuant to some law that gives him aid, comfort, or incentive .... 230

Also supporting Adams is Hall v. Garson2l which involved the
constitutionality of a statutory landlord's lien enforced by the landlord's private seizure of the tenant's property. The court found
state action on the basis that
the entry into another's home and the seizure of another's property
[were acts that possess] many, if not all, of the characteristics of
an act of the State. The execution of a lien, whether a traditional
security interest or a quasi writ of attachment or judgment lien
has n Texas traditionally been the function of the Sheriff or constable. Thus [the statute in question] vests in the landlord and
his agents authority that is normally exercised by the state and
historically has been a state function. 232
Santiago v. McElroy233 also involved the constitutionality of a
landlord's statutory right of distraint, ironically the codified version
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
see Stone Machinery Co. v. Kessler, 1 Wash. App. 750, 463 P.2d 651
(1970), where the sheriff accompanied the repo goon. This situation may be controlled by Adickes.
230 398 U.S. at 203, 212.
231430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
Contra, Kerrigan v. Boucher, 326 F. Supp.
647 (D. Conn.), aff'd 450 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Dielen v. Levine, 344
F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1972).
232 430 F.2d at 439.
233 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
See also Musselman v. Spies, 343 F. Supp.
528 (M.D. Pa. 1972); and Sellers v. Contino, 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
22842

229But

1972]

REPOSSESSION OF CONSUMER GOODS

of the landlord's distraint that gave rise to the summary writ of replevin. In Santiago, however, there was also a standard-form lease
which, by its terms, purported to give the landlord the right of distraint by contract. State action was found, but not by reason of the
landlord's self-help repossession, an issue which the court thought
was unnecessary to decide. It was found in the distress sale, which
the statute required to be carried out by a sheriff or other public
official.2 34 Thus Santiago is readily distinguishable from Adams because of the direct participation of state officials in the very step of
the procedure being attacked.23 5
Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co. 236 might also be considered precedent supporting the Adams result. The court there held unconstitutional under Sniadach the termination of public utility service
for alleged nonpayment where there was no notice or opportunity
for a hearing. The defendant there, however, was a state-created
monopoly whose practices, including the authority to cut off service, were subject to direct state regulation and control. Thus, a
finding of state action was not difficult, and the case is not closely
analogous to Adams.
The cases just described suggest three possible arguments for
finding state action in self-help repossession: (1) because the creditor's right to repossession derives from or is encouraged by UCC
section 9-503, a state statute expressing state policy; (2) because
repossession is an act traditionally performed by state officials and
self-help repossession, therefore, involves the state authorizing a
private party to perform a state function; and (3) because selfhelp repossession, insofar as it is aided in enforcement or is given
legal recognition by the state, involves state action. 37
As Professor Charles Black put it, "there were and are no clear
234 See also United States v. Barr, 295 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), finding state
action by private parties authorized by statute to act as process servers.
235
Kerrigan v. Boucher, 326 F. Supp. 647 (D. Conn. 1971), also involving a
landlord's lien or right of distraint, found no state action. Logan v. Short, 342 F.
Supp. 1349 (E.D. Mo. 1972), found no state action in the private foreclosure under a
deed of trust. In Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308 (D.C. 1970), and Roos v.
Belcher, 79 Idaho 473, 321 P.2d 210 (1958), private foreclosure sales of real estate
were found constitutional without discussion of the state action issue.
But see Taglianetti v. N.E. Tel. & Tel.,
230 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
81 R. . 351 (1954) an early case not finding state action in a utilities cutoff. See also
Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Intercontinental Indus. Inc. v.
American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971).
237 In those states which license private repossessors, such as California, there is an
additional argument probably now precluded by Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 404
U.S. 816, 934 (1972), which held that the granting of a liquor license did not make
discrimination by the licensee state action.
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and concrete tests of state action; the concept is notoriously, scan' 23 8
dalously lacking in these; it is itself nothing but a catch-phrase.
It is impossible to confidently predict how the Supreme Court will
ultimately rule on the issue of state action in the case of self-help
repossession, but it is worth analyzing the theories suggested by the
above cases.
2. UCC Section 9-503 as State Action.- Nothing could be
more clearly state action than the adoption by the individual states
of the Uniform Commercial Code. The issue, however, is not
whether Code section 9-503 is state action, but whether self-help
repossession pursuant to section 9-503 is state action and thus deprives a person of property without due process of law.3 9 Section
9-503 does not in itself require that any secured creditor have the
right to private repossession. As is true with most of the UCC, it
may be varied by agreement of the parties. 240 If section 9-503 were
mandatory in its effect on the parties, the case would be quite different and it would be much easier to find state action. 4' On the
other hand, by enacting section 9-503 a state does not remain truly
neutral. Even if the parties make no express agreement regarding
self-help repossession, section 9-503 gives the secured party that
right. In this respect section 9-503 is analogous to proposition 14,
the California constitutional amendment involved in Reitman.
Proposition 14 not only made it possible for private citizens to
discriminate, it gave the right to discriminate the status of a constitutional right, one that cannot be restricted by the usual methods
of state or local legislation. Thus, in both Reitman and Adams the
state has not remained neutral but has made it more difficult for
private citizens in their law making capacities, as voters and makers
of contracts, to opt out of the privately authorized conduct. As in
Reitman, section 9-503 expresses a state policy favoring and encouraging a private action which, if done by the state, would be unconstitutional.
Nonetheless, if Reitman applies to Adams for only those reasons
suggested above, it surely would be little more than the ideological tinkering decried by the dissenters in Fuentes. Repeal of section
9-503 would still leave the parties to a security agreement free to in238Black, "State Action," Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81
HARV. L. REV. 69, 88 (1967).
23 9
See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 392 (1967) (Harlan, J.,dissenting); P.
KAUPER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CoNsTITuTIoN 143 (1962).
240 UCC §§ 1-102(3), (4).
241

Accord, Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
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dude a provision for self-help repossession. At least in the case of
consumer transactions, we can be sure that such a clause would always be included, as in practice it now is. Even if the debtor could
understand the meaning and import of the clause, he would be powerless to have it removed. He cannot go elsewhere, for all other
creditor's contracts would say the same thing. So if he needed
credit he would have no choice but to grant the creditor the right
to self-help repossession without notice or an opportunity for a
hearing. Therefore, when dealing with consumer transactions,
leaving the matter to private contract means leaving it up to the
creditors. A consumer credit contract is in reality private law-making in which the creditor has the only vote.242
Before taking these assertions as a new argument for state action
it should be realized that consumer credit transactions could hardly
be otherwise. Consumer credit must be processed on a mass basis
with standardized contracts just as goods must be mass produced in
standard sizes, shapes, and forms if they are to be within the economic grasp of the average consumer. Custom-made contracts like
custom-made goods are expensive. Individually negotiated consumer credit contracts are not worth the price, and consumers are
not collectively organized so as to play a role in the drafting of the
contracts. "4 3 It is neither accident nor the result of conspiracy that
virtually all consumer secured credit agreements contain a clause
giving the creditor the right of self-help repossession. Such a
clause is clearly in the creditor's interest and when it is left to him
he naturally will include it. It matters little whether the industry
is in competition or is oligopolistic since there would be little competition in the terms of default in credit contracts.244 Few consumers read or understand the small print and fewer still are concerned with default procedures at the moment the sale is made or
the credit extended. Any creditor's attorney who failed to include
such a clause when drafting his client's contracts should be dismissed as incompetent - unless, of course, he had good reason to
believe the clause illegal and unenforceable or that the clause
would cause his client to lose customers.
Since the state is not responsible for creating the conditions that
result in this one-sided private lawmaking, the results of that law2 42

See generally Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971).
Mr. Slawson's helpful analysis
has contributed greatly to the discussion here.
2 43
See Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700 (1939).
244 Slawson, supra note 242, at 531.
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making - the consumer credit contract - should not be considered state action. 245 Of course, the argument for state action becomes much stronger if the party drafting the contract has a
monopoly power that is created or tolerated by the state, such as
the case of the public utility in Palmer v. Columbia Gas,246 or if the
contract is drafted by a conspiracy of creditors (perhaps a trade association), which for this purpose would be the equivalent of a
monopoly.
Absent such significant monopoly power on the creditor's side,
freedom of contract should not yield a basis for a finding of state
action, at least for purposes of the due process clause. In this regard recall the discussion concerning contracts of adhesion in connection with Fuentes and Swarb v. Lennox. 247 Once a constitutional right is found to have been violated, which involves a finding
of state action, it seems perfectly sensible to ignore the language in
adhesion contracts which purports to waive those constitutional
rights. This, however is far different from saying that the state is
involved in every term of a contract of adhesion. Waiver of a
constitutional right must be done knowingly and intelligently, but
every term in a consumer credit contract is not a constitutional mat248

ter.

3. Legal Recognition by the State of the Private Repossession
as State Action.- A recent article by Professor Barkley Clark suggests that "the imprimatur of UCC §9-503, coupled with the use of
the court system to grind out deficiency judgments following repossession would seem to constitute sufficient state action under the
fourteenth amendment.' '249 Code section 9-503 has been dealt
with above, but the other aspect of Professor Clark's statement deserves discussion. There are two threads to Professor Clark's suggestion about, as he calls it, the "deficiency judgment machine."
First, as Professor Clark argues persuasively, section 9-503 is only
one of many sections in Part 5 of Article 9 of the UCC which favors
the creditor, often to a greater degree than did the pre-Code law.
Two instances mentioned are the authorization of acceleration
245 But see Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REv. 208, 217, 220 (1970).
246 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
247 See text accompanying note 116 supra.
248
But see Skilton & Heisted, Protection of the Installment Buyers of Goods Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1475 (1967).
249 Clark, supra note 34, at 329. To support this hypothesis Clark cites only Adams
v. Egley and Reitman v. Mulkey.
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clauses and the elimination of the election of remedies doctrine.2 50
Each of these provisions, when applied to consumer transactions,
makes repossession and deficiencies more likely. I generally agree
with his analysis of the unfortunate way that Article 9 treats the
consumer in fact if not in theory. These other provisions, however, have nothing to do with the due process issue under section
9-503, which is concerned only with the availability of notice and
hearing.
In most cases, when consumer goods are repossessed there is a
discrepancy between the value of the collateral, or what it realizes,
and the amount of the debt plus the costs of repossession and resale.
Frequently the creditor will resort to the courts to establish and to
collect the deficiencies. 25 At this point an organ of the state - the
court - is called upon to determine the lawfulness of the repossession. As indicated earlier, if the repossession is unlawful because
it involved a breach of the peace, some courts have held the creditor guilty of conversion and, at a minimum, the debtor is entitled
to be credited with the value of the goods repossessed rather than
the amount realized on the resale. 252 It is at least arguable that if
the court deems a self-help repossession without notice or opportunity for a hearing as lawful, it is, in a sense, enforcing the repossession clause of the contract. " ' At this point the often cited but
seldom decisive case of Shelley v. Kraemer254 may be used to sipport
a finding of state action. Shelley held that enforcement by a state
court of racially restrictive covenants in real property deeds constituted state action and thus violated the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
This is not the place to fully explore the enigma of Shelley v.
Kraemer. The case, however, has not been read to make any action
by a court giving legal effect to privately created rights "state action" for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Shelley involved
what in effect is private zoning, traditionally a state activity. Furthermore, Shelley involved an attempt to affirmatively enforce a
racial covenant against a willing seller and a willing buyer. In the
250

UCC §§ 3-109(1) (c), 9-504(2).

251The early reports of the National Commission on Consumer Finance Studies

indicate that deficiency suits are not as common as one would think. See Johnson, Creditors' Remedies and Rate Ceilings, 26 PERSONAL FINANcE L.Q. REP. 64, 65 (1972).
252
See note 200 supra, & accompanying text.
25
3 But see, Thorp Credit Corp. v. Barr, CCH SEcuRED TRANS. GUIDE 5 51,925
(Iowa Sup. Ct. 1972).
254334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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case of private repossession the courts are not called upon to enforce the creditor's right to possession but only to recognize that the
repossession was done legally.
The distinction between court enforcement of privately created
rights and giving legal effect to those rights is supported by Evans v.
Abney.255 There property had been conveyed in trust to the city of
Macon, Georgia for a park for the exclusive use of whites. When
the Supreme Court held that the park could not constitutionally exclude blacks,25 the Georgia courts subsequently held the purpose of
the trust could not be carried out and that the land therefore must
revert to the heirs of the donor. This action by the Georgia courts
was held constitutional by the Supreme Court in Evans v. Abney,
even though in holding that the property reverted, the Georgia courts
had to give legal effect to the racial restriction in the deed of trust.
The relevance of Evans is even greater, for the racial restriction on
the deed was authorized by a statute which probably had changed
the common law.25
Finally, the most recent important state action decision by the
Supreme Court, while not in point, indicates that the Court is not
likely to expand the current concept of state action even in racial
discrimination cases.2 58 And the concept of the state action may
well be narrower when applied to the due process clause than the
2 59
equal protection clause.
4. Repossession as Private Parties Carrying Out Traditionally
Public Functions.- The foundation for a finding of state action
where private parties are carrying out a traditional state function derives from Marsh v. Alabama2 60 and Smith v. Allwright. 8
In
Marsh v. Alabama the Supreme Court held that a company town is
bound to the legal strictures of a state municipality if it so functions.
In Smith v. Allwright the Court held that the Texas Democratic
Party, even if allegedly a voluntary and private organization, could
not discriminate on the basis of race in its primary elections. Later
cases held that states cannot insulate the electoral process by dele396 U.S. 435 (1970).
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
2571d. at 310.
2 8
-5 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 404 U.S. 816, 934 (1972).
259 Note 270 infra & accompanying text.
260 326 U.S. 501 (1948).
261321 U.S. 649 (1944).
255
256
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gating the conduct of primary elections entirely to "private" political
263
parties, 202 and the principle has been applied in other contexts.
The state function theory was applied to Sniadach rights in Hall
v. Garson.2 64 There the Court said that execution of a lien in Texas
had traditionally been a function of the Sheriff or constable and
therefore found state action when a landlord so authorized by statute seized the tenant's property. Assuming the Court accurately described the Texas tradition, the question remains whether the tradition is the same for self-help repossession.
Pollock and Maitland tell us that early English law prohibited
"in uncompromising terms any and every attempt to substitute force
for judgment," and that "[i]n our own day our law allows an
amount of quiet self-help that would havre shocked Bracton."26 5 But
they were talking of the 13th century and admit that things became
more lax during the later middle ages. The one exception to the
early law's prejudice against self-help was the landlord's power to
distrain. But even this was limited and was subject to hazards not
too different from those found today in self-help repossession.2 6
Gilmore tells us that
[tJhe secured party's right to take possession of collateral on default
and without judicial proceedings is a relatively late development.
The seventeenth century pattern . . . required the institution of a
suit in equity for foreclosure. The right to take possession without
applying to a court for permission was concomitant of the mortgagee's right to conduct his own foreclosure under a power of sale
clause, whose validity came to be recognized during the nineteenth
centuryBT
However, all modern security statutes, including the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act 6 6 and the Uniform Conditional Sales Act26 9 which predated the UCC, permit the creditor the right of self-help repossession.
Thus, whether repossession of property subject to a security interest was traditionally a function of the state depends on how long
262Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
263 See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
264
2

430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970).
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAr-LAND,

THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 574 (2d ed.

1968).
266 Id. at 576.
267 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY

(1965).

2 68

U.T.R.A. § 6(2).
§ 16.

269 UCS.A.

§

44.1, at 1212
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it takes to make a tradition. If we have to go back to the time of
the drafting of the Constitution, then it would seem tradition is
that repossession is a function of the state. If our point of reference is the time the fourteenth amendment was adopted, the tradition is not so clear. In any event, self-help repossession is nothing
new. If tradition be the guide, I would guess the Supreme Court
would not find it a matter of state action on that basis alone. It is
difficult to see anything inherent in repossession that makes it peculiarly a function of the state and so this theory for a finding of state
action, like the others, to me seems not determinative.
Furthermore, there is considerable reason to question whether
state action has the same meaning when applied to the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment than it does when applied to
the equal protection clause. 2 "° As suggested by the Oiler case, the
fourteenth amendment was directed primarily at the evils of racial
27
discrimination. 1
There remains a very practical consideration that may in the end
win the day. When repossession takes place without his knowledge, a debtor is just as helpless and as propertyless after self-help
repossession as with replevin. If it makes sense to require notice
and an opportunity for a hearing prior to seizure in a replevin action,
it should make sense prior to self-help repossession. The fourteenth amendment is not just part of a constitution but is a most
fundamental expression of policy. While not convincing to me, there
is enough in the arguments discussed above to permit a Supreme
Court so inclined to find state action in self-help repossession. On
the other hand, with only a minority of the present Court voting
for the requirement of notice and an opportunity for a hearing in
replevin actions, that inclination is at best questionable.
But the Constitution is not the only depository of wisdom and
policy. If notice and an opportunity for a hearing before seizure
make sense in a replevin action, as I believe they do, the state legislatures should require the same procedures for self-help repossession.
Perhaps, as suggested earlier, mere notice by the creditor, if it is
formal enough to strike home, would be sufficient if it were done in
connection with the filing of a suit for a deficiency judgment. I
would not, as does the National Consumer Act, do away entirely
with the self-help remedy. While in some ways less desirable than
270 Black, supra note 238, at 85; P. KAUPER, supra note 239, at 128-29.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1966).
271 342 F. Supp. at 23.
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replevin, given the accounts of terror and humiliation through
heavy-handed techniques, self-help repossession often will be the
least expensive remedy for the creditor and thus of obvious advantage to the debtor ultimately saddled with that expense.
Since the debtor pays this expense in the deficiency judgment it
would not seem in his interest to require repossession only through
the courts. Where the debtor cannot pay for the costs of repossession the creditor must. If we increase the costs for the creditors we
probably increase the cost or decrease the availability of credit, or so
our economic theory would tell us.
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the requirements for notice and the opportunity for a
hearing may increase the creditor's cost, that increment is probably
not very great and is, in any event, justified. As I have tried to
show, the changes in replevin procedures required by Fuentes, and
even the system suggested here, when applied to either replevin or
self-help repossession will only somewhat alter the balance of power
between creditors and debtors. It need not significantly interfere
with the legitimate secured creditor's remedies even in the unusual
case of the true deadbeat and it will not damage the value of the
personal property security interest.
Fuentes, as I read it, and the reforms I propose will by no means
solve the problems of the consumer. It will do nothing to help
those probably in greatest need - debtors who are in default and
cannot pay. It will help the debtor who is quick enough in mind
and deed to prevent an injustice from being done to him. And
even for the alert debtor, notice and an opportunity for a hearing
will not be much help until he or our society can find a solution to
the problem of providing adequate legal services to the poor and
middle class. The procedure for notice and a hearing prior to repossession, however, represents another step, even if a small one,
toward assuring the debtor as well as the creditor his due.

